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RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS
Des ordinateurs aux équipements médicaux en passant par les montres
et les voitures, depuis plusieurs décenies les logiciels occupent une place
de plus en plus importante dans tous les aspects de notre vie. Ils peuvent
nous assister dans notre quotidien (appareils ménagers, voitures, etc.), nous
permettre de communiquer avec les autres grâce à des outils connectés (or-
dinateurs, smartphones, montres, etc.) et nous divertir par le biais de jeux,
de ﬁlms et de musique.
Ces changements ont certes eu des effets bénéﬁques sur notre mode
de vie dans de nombreux domaines : santé, transports, science, agricul-
ture, etc., mais il ne faut pas oublier que les logiciels peuvent ne pas avoir
le comportement exact que nous attendons en raison de la complexité des
mécanismes mis en place. Ces soi-disant bogues peuvent avoir des consé-
quences critiques : ils peuvent soit être la cause d’accidents, comme ce fut
le cas pour l’échec du lancement d’Ariane 5 en 1996 [31], soit être une faille
pour des attaques malveillantes telles que le bogue Heartbleed apparu en
2012 et divulgué en 2014 [1] permettant à un attaquant d’écouter et de voler
des données de communications cryptées.
Méthodes formelles
Pour surmonter les bugs, les informaticiens ont d’abord mis au point des
méthodes de test dans le but de détecter les comportements erronés. Les
techniques de test présentent l’avantage que, lorsqu’un bogue est détecté,
il est généralement possible de retracer la trace d’éxécution et de renvoyer
automatiquement les informations nécessaires à sa résolution. Cependant,
cela présente un inconvénient : ne pas trouver un bogue dans un programme
ne garantit pas que celui-ci n’en comporte pas, car dans le cas général, le
nombre des exécutions possibles est inﬁni.
Inversement, les méthodes formelles permettent de prouver des proprié-
tés et d’assurer qu’un programme ne présente pas certains comportements.
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Contrairement aux méthodes de test, elles garantissent qu’aucun bogue lié
à la propriété prouvée ne peut apparaître lors de l’exécution du programme
analysé. Un autre avantage des méthodes formelles est qu’elles ne néces-
sitent pas l’exécution du programme et reposent sur des outils purement ma-
thématiques.
Bien que les tests aient été largement utilisés dans l’industrie depuis de
nombreuses décennies, les méthodes formelles sont maintenant sufﬁsam-
ment développées pour rivaliser avec les tests sur des projets de niveaux
industriels : depuis 2011, Amazon utilise des spéciﬁcations formelles et des
vériﬁcations de modèles pour résoudre des problèmes concrets [32].
Vie privée et protection des données
Les logiciels étant partout, cela signiﬁe qu’ils ont accès à de plus en plus
de données. Combiné au fait que ces outils ont souvent la capacité de dif-
fuser des données vers d’autres périphériques (via Internet par exemple),
cela soulève une question de conﬁdentialité importante. Il est souvent né-
cessaire de fournir une certaine quantité de donnée aux logiciels pour leur
bon fonctionnement mais nous voudrions que ces données ne soient pas
envoyés n’importe où. Par exemple, une personne qui se connecte à son
compte bancaire à partir d’un navigateur ne veut certainement pas que son
mot de passe soit envoyé partout sur Internet. Inversement, certains logiciels
ont pour but de recevoir des données et de ne pas les afﬁcher à l’utilisateur.
C’est le cas, par exemple, des bloqueurs de publicités essayant de bloquer
les publicités et des outils de sécurité parentale visant à ne pas afﬁcher de
contenu sensible. Le point commun de ces deux problèmes est la gestion du
ﬂux de données dans les logiciels.
Non-interférence
Une façon de donner des garanties sur le ﬂux de données est d’assurer
la Non-Interférence. La non-interférence est une propriété de sécurité qui
garantit l’indépendance de certaines sorties spéciﬁques par rapport à des
entrées spéciﬁques d’un programme. Pour revenir à l’exemple de saisie d’un
mot de passe dans un navigateur, nous voudrions garantir que les données
envoyées à tous les sites internet autres que le site internet de la banque (les
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sorties spéciﬁques) ne dépendent pas du mot de passe saisi dans le champ
"mot de passe" de la page internet de la banque (l’entrée spéciﬁque).
La non-interférence est une hyperpropriété [17] : pour donner un contre-
exemple à la propriété il ne sufﬁt pas de montrer une exécution particulière
du programme (contraire au accès mémoire illégaux par exemple) mais en
comparant les résultat d’au moins deux exécutions.
But
Le but de cette thèse est de fournir un cadre permettant de prouver des
analyseurs de non-interférence. Etant donné un langage avec sa séman-
tique, nous visons à construire une sémantique alternative dans laquelle une
interférence peut être détectée par une seule dérivation, permettant ainsi des
preuves simples par induction sur de telles dérivations.
Considérer qu’une seule exécution de la sémantique d’origine n’est clai-
rement pas sufﬁsant pour déterminer si un programme est non interférent.
Étonnamment, étudier chaque exécution indépendamment et collecter des
informations sur les dépendances n’est toujours pas sufﬁsant. Nous propo-
sons donc une approche formelle qui construit, à partir de toute sémantique
respectant une certaine structure, une multisémantique permettant de rai-
sonner simultanément sur plusieurs exécutions. L’ajout d’annotations à cette
multisémantique nous permet de capturer les dépendances entre les entrées
et les sorties d’un programme.
Nous montrons que notre approche est correcte, c’est-à-dire que les
annotations capturent correctement la non-interférence. Cela nous permet
de certiﬁer des analyses correctes sans nous ﬁer à la propriété de
non-ingérence, mais plutôt à la multisémantique annotée. Pour illustrer notre
approche, nous présentons un petit langage While et sa sémantique, nous
construisons sa multisémantique annotée et nous prouvons un analyseur de
ce langage.
Plan
Le reste du manuscrit est rédigé en anglais et est séparé en chapitre de
la manière suivante : Le chapitre 1 introduit les notions préliminaires : la
non-interférence, l’assistant de preuve Coq et Pretty-Big-Step. Le chapitre 2
9
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formalise Pretty-Big-Step en Coq et un exemple concret de language WHILE.
Le chapitre 3 décrit comment construire automatiquement une multiséman-
tique. Le chapitre 4 annote cette multisémantique et explique le fonctionne-
ment des annotations. Enﬁn, le chapitre 5 prouve la correction des annota-
tions et montre comment utiliser la multisémantique annotée pour prouver un
analyseur.
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INTRODUCTION
From computers to medical equipment via watches and cars, since a few
decades software has been taking an increasing place in every aspect of our
lives. It can help our personal routines (as in household appliance, cars, ...),
communicate with others thanks to connected tools (as computers, smart-
phones, watches), and entertain us through games, ﬁlms and music. This
changes have certainly brought beneﬁts in our way of life in many domains :
health, transport, science, agriculture, ... but it must not be forgotten that soft-
ware may not have the exact behaviour we expect because of the complexity
of the mechanisms at stake. These so-called bugs may have critical conse-
quences : they can either be the cause of accidents as it has been the case
for the Ariane 5 launch failure in 1996 [31] or be a backdoor for malicious at-
tacks as the Heartbleed bug allowing an attacker to eavesdrop and steal data
from encrypted communications introduced in 2012 and disclosed in 2014
[1].
Formal methods
To overcome bugs, computer scientists ﬁrstly developed testing methods
with the intent of ﬁnding wrong behaviours. Testing techniques have the ad-
vantage that, when a bug is found, it is generally possible to track back its
source and automatically return the needed information to ﬁx it. However this
comes with a downside : not ﬁnding a bug in a program does not ensure that
the program will always behave correctly since in the general case the set of
all the possible executions is inﬁnite.
Conversely, formal methods allow to prove properties and ensure that a
program may not have some behaviours. Unlike testing methods, they give
guarantees that no bug related to the proven property can appear during an
execution of the analyzed program. Another advantage of formal methods is
that they do not require to execute the program and rely on purely mathema-
tical tools.
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While testing has been widely used in the industry since many decades,
formal methods are now developed enough to compete testing in industrial
projects : since 2011, Amazon has used formal speciﬁcation and model che-
cking to solve real-life challenges [32].
Privacy and data protection
Software being everywhere, it implies that it has access to more and more
data. Combined with the fact that those tools often have the ability to broad-
cast data to other devices (through the internet for example), it raises an
important privacy issue. There is a lot of kind of data that we have to give
to a software but at the same time that we don’t want the software to send
anywhere. For example, someone who logs in to his/her bank account from
a browser certainly does not want his/her password to be send all over the
internet. Conversely, there is software that has the purpose of receiving data
an not display it to the user. For instance it is the case of ad-blockers trying to
block ads and parental security tools that aim to not display sensitive content.
The common point of these two issues is managing the data ﬂow in software.
Non-interference
One way to give guarantees over the ﬂow of data is to ensure
Non-Interference. Non-interference is a program security property that gives
guarantees on the independence of speciﬁc outputs from speciﬁc inputs of a
program. Going back to the example of entering a password in a browser,
we would want to guarantee that the data sent to every website that is not
the bank’s website (the speciﬁc outputs) does not depend on the password
entered in the "password" ﬁeld on the bank’s web-page (the speciﬁc input).
Non-interference is a hyperproperty [17] : giving a counter-example to the
property cannot be done by exhibiting one particular execution of the program
(unlike illegal memory access for example), but by comparing the results of
at least two executions.
Goal
The goal of this thesis is to provide a framework to prove analyzers of non-
interference. When given a language with its semantics, we aim at building an
12
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alternative semantics where interference may be detected through a single
derivation, hence enabling simple proofs by induction on such derivations.
Considering a single execution of the original semantics is clearly not
sufﬁcient to determine if a program is non-interferent. Surprisingly, studying
every execution independently and gathering dependency information is also
not sufﬁcient. We thus propose a formal approach that builds, from any se-
mantics respecting a certain structure, a multisemantics that allows to reason
on several executions simultaneously. Adding annotations to this multiseman-
tics lets us capture the dependencies between inputs and outputs of a pro-
gram.
We show that our approach is correct, i.e., annotations correctly capture
non-interference. This lets us certify sound analyses without relying on the
non-interference property, but relying instead on the annotated multiseman-
tics. To illustrate our approach, we present a small While language and its
semantic, we build its annotated multisemantics, and we prove an analyzer
over this language.
Outline
Chapter 1 presents general background related to the non-interference
property, the Coq proof assistant and Pretty-Big-Step. Chapter 2 gives the
coq formalization of Pretty-Big-Step and a concrete WHILE language written
in this formalization. Chapter 3 describes how to automatically build a multi-
semantics given a Pretty-Big-Step. Chapter 4 annotates the multisemantics
and explains the annotation mechanism. Finally Chapter 5 proves the correct-
ness of the annotations and shows how the framework is used in an analyzer
proof.
Source code
Each theorem, lemma, hypothesis or deﬁnition that appears in the thesis
and that has been formalized in coq comes with a symbol indicating a link
to the online proofs scripts.
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CHAPITRE 1
BACKGROUND
This ﬁrst chapter focuses on giving some background on three main
things : the non-interference property, the Coq proof assistant and the
Pretty-Big-Step semantics.
In all the document we will follow some usual notations listed in Figure
1.1 in case of any ambiguity. The notations directly coming from our work are
deﬁned in the corresponding sections.
— For any function f : E → F , and elements x ∈ E, v ∈ F ,
f [x �→ v] denotes the function y �→



v if x = y
f(y) otherwise
.
— For any function f : E → F , and subset H ⊂ E,
f(H) is the image of H through f .
— For any partial function f : E → F ,
Dom(f) ⊆ E denotes the domain on which f is deﬁned ;
— The symbol :: is used for adding an element to a list and the symbol @
is used for list concatenation.
FIGURE 1.1 – Notations used in the whole document
1.1 Non-interference
Static analyses of non-interference take their roots in 1977 with E. Cohen
[18] and D. E. Denning & P. J. Denning [21]. They both propose static me-
thods to track the ﬂow of sensitive data in a program. The property is then
formalized in 1982 by J. A. Goguen & J. Meseguer [23] as following :
One group of users, using a certain set of commands, is non-
interfering with another group of users if what the ﬁrst group does
with those commands has no effect on what the second group of
users can see.
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This formalization oversteps the programming languages domain and can
be applied in network security, social interactions, ...
1.1.1 Deﬁnition
In our case, we deﬁne non-interference speciﬁcally for programming lan-
guages. Suppose we have a programming language in which variables can
be private or public. We say a program is non-interferent if, for any pair of exe-
cution that initially agree on the public variables, then the values of the public
variables are the same after the execution. In other words, changing the va-
lue of the private variables does not inﬂuence the ﬁnal public variables. Or in
yet other words, the public variables do not depend on the private variables :
there is no leak of private information.
Deﬁnition 1 (Termination-Insensitive Non-interference - TINI). A program is
non-interferent if, for any pair of terminating executions starting with same
value in the public variables, the executions end with the same value in
the public variables.
This deﬁnition only considers ﬁnite program executions. We illustrate
through four examples of increasing complexity where leaks of private
information may happen and how one may detect them. In all of them
public is a public variable and secret is a private variable.
If we look back at Goguen & Meseguer’s deﬁnition, the ﬁrst group of users
is the private variables, the second group is the public variables and the com-
mands are the terms of the language. It is important to notice that what the
second group can see is the value in the public variables at the beginning
and the end of an execution ; it does not includes what happens during the
execution.
1.1.2 Undecidability
Before trying to capture non-interference, it is necessary to understand
how hard it is and we show that it is undecidable. To prove that the non-
interference property is undecidable, we reduce the problem of knowing if
16
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a program is terminating-insensitive non-interferent to the halting problem
which is known to be undecidable.
We suppose we have an algorithm A determining if a program is TINI or
not and we build a new one solving the halting problem.
Let us consider a program P and an input I of the program. We also
consider two variables public and private not appearing in P and I and that
are respectively public and private. With these elements we build the program
P � deﬁned as
P (I); public := private
We claim that P (I) halts if and only if P � is not TINI.
— On one hand, if P (I) halts, then considering two executions (one with
true and the other one with false in the variable private) will end up
with different values in the variable public. This is ensured by the fact
that the computation of P (I) doesn’t modify the value of private since
it doesn’t appear in P and I. The deﬁnition of TINI doesn’t hold for P �.
— On the other hand, if P (I) doesn’t halt, then the set of all terminating
executions of P � is empty. Thus P � is TINI.
This way we can construct the following algorithm to solve the halting
problem :
Input: P,I
if A(P (I); public := private) then
return false
else
return true
end
Thus, TINI is undecidable.
Knowing that TINI is undecidable makes impossible the existence of a
complete and correct analysis.
1.1.3 Flow patterns
There are different ways to leak information and to make a program inter-
ferent (or not non-interferent). In order to introduce the initial idea behind the
17
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multisemantics, we give a non-exhaustive list of program patterns that can
leak information.
Direct ﬂow As a simple ﬁrst example, the program of Figure 1.2 is clearly
interferent : changing the value of secret changes the value of public. If we
stick to the deﬁnition, we can say this program is interferent because there
exists two executions starting in the environments {public : true; private :
false} and {public : true; private : true} (in which the values of the public
variable are the same), and respectively ending in the environments {public :
false; private : false} and {public : true; private : true} (in which the values
of the public variable are different).
public := secret
FIGURE 1.2 – Direct information ﬂows
This is a direct ﬂow of information because the value of secret is directly
assigned into public.
Indirect ﬂow Unfortunately, direct ﬂows are not the only sources of inter-
ference. It may also come from the context in which a particular instruction
is executed. For example, the program of Figure 1.3 shows a program with
an indirect ﬂow. The value of secret is not directly stored into public but
the condition in the if statements ensures that in each case secret receives
the value of public. One may thus detect interference by taking into account
the context in which an assignment takes place. Any single execution of this
program would then witness the interference.
if secret
then public := true
else public := false
FIGURE 1.3 – Indirect information ﬂows
18
1.1. Non-interference
Masking Another source of interference is the fact that not executing a part
of the code can provide information. This is often called masking. The pro-
gram of Figure 1.4 illustrates the phenomenon. In the case where secret is
false, the variable public is not modiﬁed, so this execution does not witness
the interference, even when taking the context into account. The other exe-
cution, where secret is true, does witness the interference. Hence a further
reﬁnement to detect interference would be to consider all possible executions
of a program.
public := false
if secret
then public := true
else skip
FIGURE 1.4 – Masking
Double masking Unfortunately again, this is not sufﬁcient. In this last
example, in Figure 1.5, we can see that there exists no single execution
where the ﬂow can be inferred. We will refer to this example as the running
example. In the case secret = true, public depends on y, which is not
modiﬁed by the execution. In the other case secret = false, public still
depends on y, which itself depends by indirect ﬂow on x, which is not
modiﬁed by the execution. Hence in both cases there seems to be no
dependency on secret. Yet, we have public = secret at the end of both
execution, so the secret is leaked. Looking at every execution independently
is not enough.
1.1.4 Conclusion
To retrieve the interference of information ﬂow as a property of an execu-
tion, we propose a different semantics where multiple executions are consi-
dered in lock-step, so that one may combine the information gathered by
several executions. In the case of the last example, we can see that x de-
pends on secret in the ﬁrst execution at the end of the ﬁrst if. Hence, in the
second execution, x must also depend on secret, because not modifying x
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x := true
y := true
if secret
then x := false
else skip
if x
then y := false
else skip
public := y
FIGURE 1.5 – Double masking
leaks information about secret. We can similarly deduce that y depends on
x in both executions, hence public transitively depends on secret.
We thus propose to transform the non-interference hyperproperty in a pro-
perty of a reﬁned semantics. Our approach gives the ability to reason induc-
tively on the reﬁned semantics and construct formal proofs of correctness of
analyses.
secret = true
x := true
y := true
if secret
then x := false
else skip
if x
then y := false
else skip
public := y
public = true
secret = false
x := true
y := true
if secret
then x := false
else skip
if x
then y := false
else skip
public := y
public = false
(executed code, non-executed code)
FIGURE 1.6 – Running Example
1.1.5 Related work
A major inspiration of this work is the 2003 paper by A. Sabelfeld & A.
C. Myers [35]. They give an overview of the information-ﬂow techniques and
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show the many sources of potential interference. Our long-term goal is to
evaluate our approach with the full PBS semantics of JavaScript [13] and to
show that Sabelfeld and Myers listed every possible source of information
leak.
Dynamic analyses
The ﬁrst dynamic mechanism to control information ﬂow by D. Denning
[20] was based on tainting methods : when modifying a variable, the security
level of that variable becomes the highest security level of the variables used
to produce the value to store in the variable.
The thesis of G. Le Guernic [29] proposes and proves a precise dynamic
analysis for non-interference. The monitor keeps up to date the set of entities
(variables, program counter, ...) that may be different in other executions and
authorize, denies or edits the outputs depending on the state of the monitor.
T. Austin and C. Flanagan also propose sound dynamic analyses for non-
interference based on the no-sensitive-upgrade policy [5] and the permissive
upgrade policy [7].
In 2010, D. Devriese and F. Piessens [22] introduced the notion of se-
cure multi-execution allowing a sound and precise technique for information
ﬂow veriﬁcation by executing a program multiple times with different security
levels. Inspired by this work, T. Austin and C. Flanagan [6] present a new
dynamic analysis for information ﬂow based on faceted values : they contain
two values to be used in different situations, one for each security level of
the current execution. Our approach lies between secure multi-execution and
faceted execution : we do not tag data but spawn multiple executions. In our
pretty-big-step setting, however, the continuations of those executions are
shared, in a way reminiscent of faceted execution.
Our approach is similar to these works in the sense that it is based on
actual executions, but we consider every execution whereas they monitor
a single execution, modifying it if it is interferent. Our goals are also quite
different : they provide a monitor, we provide a framework to simplify the
certiﬁcation of analyses.
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Static Analyses
A. Sabelfeld and A. Russo [34, 36] prove several properties comparing sta-
tic and dynamic approaches of non-interference. In particular, purely dynamic
monitors can not be sound and permissive but it is possible for an hybrid mo-
nitor. Our framework could be a way to certify the correctness of such hybrid
monitors.
G. Barthe, P.R. D’Argenio & T. Rezk [9] reduce the problem of
non-interference of a program into a safety property of a transformation of
the program. It allows to use standard techniques based on program logic
for information ﬂow veriﬁcation. Our work is similar in the sense that we both
transform a hyperproperty into a property. Self-composition achieves it by
transforming the program, whereas we achieve it by extending the
semantics in a mechanical way. In addition, our approach never inspects the
values produced by the program, but only how it manipulates them. This is
the reason why our approach is incomplete. For instance, we do not identify
when two branches of a conditional do the same thing and we may ﬂag it as
interferent.
S. Hunt & D. Sands [27] present a family of semantically sound type sys-
tem for non-interference. The main relation between their paper and this work
is the use of dependencies : a mapping from a variable to sets of variables
they depend on in [27], a mapping from variables and outputs to set of inputs
in our case. Our work is more precise as it does not use program points but
actual executions. We also never consider the dependencies from branches
of conditionals that are taken by no execution. Once again, we do not propose
an analysis, but a generic way to mechanically build the reﬁned semantics.
Different types of non-interference
There are several modern deﬁnitions of non-interference. In particular,
non-interference may take into account the termination of an execution of
the program (termination-insensitive non-interference [3], termination-aware
non-interference [12]), or the time elapsed during the execution of the
program (timing- and termination-sensitive non-interference [28]). Our work
only considers termination-insensitive non-interference, but to be able to
deal with non-terminating executions, we speculate we would only need to
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consider a co-inductive version of the semantics we give here. We did not
go further into this conjecture and all the theorems would require different
formal proofs to ﬁt the termination-sensitive deﬁnition of the non-interference
property.
Other hyperproperties E. Cecchetti, A.C. Myers and O. Arden [15] introdu-
ced nonmalleable information ﬂow, a property generalizing non-interference.
They show it is a 4-safety hyperproperty, the ﬁrst formation security property
based on more than two executions. We believe the annotations in our work
may be adapted to ﬁt to this hyperproperty.
1.2 Coq proof assistant
Every formal proof has been conducted thanks to the coq proof assistant.
We brieﬂy describe what Coq is and present some features used in our work.
1.2.1 A proof assistant
Coq is a tool providing a language to formalize mathematical problems,
state properties and then prove them semi-automatically.
The development of Coq started in 1984 and is based on the Calculus Of
Construction by T. Coquand and G. Huet [19]. Among many theorems and
properties, it is notable that Coq has been used to prove the 4-color theorem
[24], the Feit-Thompson theorem [25] (or odd order theorem) and the certiﬁed
C compiler CompCert [30].
Coq allows to formalize mathematics with type theory thanks to the Curry-
Howard correspondence relating types with properties and programs of a
type with proofs of the corresponding theorem. Then it is possible to prove
property about that formalization thanks to instructions called tactics. These
instructions, if correctly executed, will build a proof of the desired property.
For example let us try to prove the following commutativity property of
the or operator over the formulas of the propositional calculus. First of all we
must state the property :
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Lemma or_comm : forall A B : Prop, A \/ B -> B \/ A.
We can start the proof mechanism by the keyword Proof :
Proof.
This instruction triggers a goal (initially the property to prove) and and envi-
ronment of hypotheses. We begin by introducing 2 proposition A and B in the
environment and removing them from the goal.
intros A B.
Then we can introduce the hypothesis and call it HAB.
intros HAB.
This hypothesis gives us the information that either A is true or B is true. The
tactic destruct allows to destruct the hypothesis in two parts (HA and HB)
and also to duplicate the goals. In both goals, HAB is replaced by either HA
or HB.
destruct HAB as [HA HB].
We now have to prove B \/ A in an environment where A is true and in
another environment where B is true. We use the symbol + to focus on the
ﬁrst subgoal and once it will be proved, we will be able to focus on the other
one.
+ right.
assumption.
In the ﬁrst case, the tactic right explicitly ask to prove only the right part of
the goal when the goal is a disjunction and assumption declares that the new
goal is exactly one of our hypotheses, i.e. A in that case.
+ left.
assumption.
Finally, the second proof is taken care of in a similar way.
Another important feature of the Coq language that we used in the deve-
lopments of this thesis is the type class mechanism.
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1.2.2 Type classes
Type classes were ﬁrst introduced in Haskell in 1979 [39] and adapted to
Coq in 2008 by M. Sozeau and N. Oury [37]. The goal of type classes is to
be able to program with a abstract description of a type. It perfectly ﬁts our
case since we want to mechanically derive a multisemantics for any language
given in PBS form.
As an example let us deﬁne monoids in coq. A monoid is a mathematical
structure made of a set of elements, an associative binary operator and an
identity element.
Class Monoid : Type := {
A: Type;
dot : A -> A -> A;
e : A;
}.
This deﬁnition does not perfectly ﬁt the monoid deﬁnition since we only
gave the ﬁelds of our class. In coq, since properties are types, we can add
proofs in the ﬁelds. This way we can specify the associativity of dot and the
identity property of one.
Class Monoid : Type := {
A: Type;
dot : A -> A -> A;
e : A;
dot_associative : forall x y z : A,
dot (dot x y) z = dot x (dot y z);
identity_left : forall x : A, dot e x = x;
identity_right : forall x : A, dot x e = x;
}.
This deﬁnition of monoids allows to state properties over monoids and prove
them. For instance, let us prove that the neutral element is idempotent.
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Lemma e_idempotent :
dot e e = e
.
Proof.
refine (identity_left e).
Qed.
Later, we may want to concretize the type class to use our lemma on a parti-
cular monoid. In our case we can instantiate our monoids with natural num-
bers :
Require Import NArith.
Instance myZ : Monoid := {
A := nat;
dot := plus;
e := 0;
dot_associative := PeanoNat.Nat.add_assoc;
identity_left := PeanoNat.Nat.add_0_l;
identity_right := PeanoNat.Nat.add_0_r;
}.
To have access to the proofs of associativity and identity in nat, we import the
NArith module. We can then ﬁll each ﬁeld of the monoid with the correspon-
ding elements in the particular case of the natural numbers.
Now we can use the proven lemma over all the monoids to prove the
following lemma :
Lemma plus00 : 0+0=0.
Proof.
refine (e_idempotent myNat).
Qed.
Another way to verify the concretization of this lemma is simply checking
if the type of the instantiated lemma is the expected one :
Check (e_idempotent myNat : 0+0=0).
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1.2.3 Partial functions
For clarity reasons, and in this section only, we emphasis the difference
between mathematical objects and their encodings by using different fonts.
There are two main ways to formally encode partial functions. The enco-
ding restricts either the domain or the image of the function. In the ﬁrst case,
one could deﬁne a new type to represent the domain on which the function is
mathematically deﬁned and encode the Coq function on this new type. In our
work, we have a lot of partial functions and their domains are various there-
fore parameterizing a function by a type representing its domain is uselessly
complex. Instead, we chose to represent them by restricting the image of the
functions with the option type.
For instance a mathematical partial function
f : E → F
is encoded by a function
f : E -> option F
such that, for all elements x ∈ E, y ∈ F , if f(x) = y then f(x) returns Some
y ; and for all element x out of the domain of f , f(x) returns None.
1.3 Pretty-Big-Step
As we aim to provide a generic framework independent of a speciﬁc pro-
gramming language, we need a precise and simple way to describe its se-
mantics. The Pretty-Big-Step semantics [16] is not only concise, it has been
shown to scale to complex programming languages while still being ame-
nable to formalization with a proof assistant [13]. We slightly modify the deﬁ-
nition of Pretty-Big-Step to make it more uniform and to simplify the deﬁnition
of non-interference.
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1.3.1 What is PBS ?
The Pretty-Big-Step semantics is a constrained Big-Step semantics where
each rule may only have 0, 1, or 2 inductive premises. In addition, one only
needs to know the term under evaluation and the current state to decide
which rule applies. To illustrate the Pretty-Big-Step approach, let us consider
the evaluation of a conditional. It may look like these two rules in Big-Step
format.
IFTRUE
M, e → (M �, true) M �, s1 → M ��
M, if e then s1 else s2 → M ��
IFFALSE
M, e → (M �, false) M �, s2 → M ��
M, if e then s1 else s2 → M ��
where e, s1 and s2 are terms, and M, M � and M �� are memory state.
Although these rules only have two inductive premises each, one has to
partially execute them to know which one is applicable. In Pretty-Big-Step,
one ﬁrst evaluates the expression e, then passes control to another rule to
decide which branch to evaluate. Additional constructs are needed to des-
cribe these intermediate steps, they are called extended terms, often written
with a 1 or 2 subscript, and the state in which they are evaluated often include
previously computed values. Here are the rules for evaluating a conditional in
Pretty-Big-Step.
IF
M, e → (M �, v) (M �, v), If1 s1 s2 → M ��
M, if e then s1 else s2 → M ��
IFTRUE
M, s1 → M �
(M, true), If1 s1 s2 → M �
IFFALSE
M, s2 → M �
(M, false), If1 s1 s2 → M �
The evaluation of the expression has been factorized into one single rule IF.
Formally, rules are in three groups :
i) axioms, the rules with no inductive premise ;
ii) rules 1, the rules with one inductive premise ;
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iii) rules 2, the rules with two inductive premises.
Ax
σ, t → σ� R1
σ1, t1 → σ�1
σ, t → σ� R2
σ1, t1 → σ�1 σ2, t2 → σ�2
σ, t → σ�
FIGURE 1.7 – Types of rules for a Pretty-Big-Step semantics
In Pretty-Big-Step, rules may take as input a memory and zero, one, or
several values and they may either return a memory or a memory and also
several value. To account for this in a uniform way, we deﬁne a state σ ∈ State
as a pair of a memory and a list of values, called an extra. We write extra(σ)
to refer to the list of values in a state σ. As often as possible, we will denote
state with the letter σ (σ1,σ�, . . . ) and memories with the letter M (M1, M �, . . . ).
To simplify notations, if the extra is an empty list, we omit the extra and we
only write the memory ; and if the extra is a singleton then we denote the
state as a pair of a memory and the value in the extra.
A rule is entirely deﬁned by the following components.
— Axioms
— t : term, the term on which the axiom can be applied ;
— ax : State → State, a function that give the resulting state given the
initial state.
— Rule 1
— t : term, the term on which the rule 1 can be applied ;
— t1 : term, a term to evaluate in order to continue the derivation ;
— up : State → State, a function that returns the new state in which t1
will be evaluated.
— Rule 2
— t : term, the term on which the rule 2 can be applied ;
— t1, t2 : term, the terms to derive in order to get the result for t ;
— up : State → State, a function returning the state in which the term
t1 has to be derived ;
— next : State ∗ State → State, a function giving the state in which t2
had to be derived depending on the initial state and the result of
the derivation of t1.
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σ1 , t1 → σ2
σ4 , t4 → σ5
σ3 , t3 → σ5
σ0 , t0 → σ5
ax
ax
up
up
next
The functions ax, up, and next are partial functions because the rules may
not be deﬁned for every state. For example, the rule IFTRUE above is deﬁned
only when the state has a single extra that is the boolean value true.
Figure 1.8 shows again the three types of rules but with their explicit com-
ponents.
Ax
σ, t → ax(σ) R1
up(σ), t1 → σ�
σ, t → σ�
R2
up(σ), t1 → σ�1 next(σ,σ�1), t2 → σ�
σ, t → σ�
FIGURE 1.8 – Types of rules for a Pretty-Big-Step semantics (bis)
When describing a derivation σ, t → σ� (or a rule with this derivation as
conclusion), we will refer to σ as the semantic context of the derivation (or
the rule) and to σ� as the result of the derivation (or the rule).
The intuition behind the Pretty-Big-Step rules is the following.
— If the evaluation is immediate, we can directly give the results (e.g.,
the evaluation of a skip statement or a constant). This behavior cor-
responds to an axiom.
— If the evaluation needs to branch depending on a previously compu-
ted value, stored as an extra, then a rule 1 is used for each possible
branching. This is used for instance after evaluating the condition in a
conditional statement.
— If the evaluation ﬁrst needs to compute an intermediate result, then
a rule 2 is used. The intermediate result is used to compute the next
state with which the evaluation continues. This is how the conditional
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statement works : ﬁrst evaluate the guard and then compute another
term in a state containing the result of the evaluation.
As an example, Figure 1.9 shows the derivation of the program
if x then 0 else 1
in a state for which the stored value of x is true.
M, x → (M, true)
M, 0 → (M, 0)
(M, true), If1 (0) (1) → (M, 0)
M, if x then 0 else 1 → (M, 0)
FIGURE 1.9 – Derivation of a simple program
1.3.2 Advantages
Modularity
The ﬁrst advantage of Pretty-Big-Step is that it is very modular : extending the
language can be done by adding new rules and without modifying previous
ones. For instance, let us suppose we have a C-like for loop :
for(initialization, condition, step){body}
and see the differences in Big-Step and Pretty-Big-Step when adding the
notion of errors. As shown in Figure 1.10, in Big-Step style, there are two
rules to write to handle the for loop : one for each evaluation of the condition.
In the ﬁrst case, we start the loop by initializing, then we test for the condition,
if the result is true we continue by evaluating the body, we proceed by doing
the step for the next loop and ﬁnally we go back to the beginning of the
loop ignoring the initialization phase. The second case also starts with the
initialization and the evaluation of the condition, but if the evaluation returns
false, the execution stops here.
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FORTRUE
M0, init → M1 M1, cond → (M2, true) M2, body → M3
M3, step → M4 M4, for(skip, cond, step){body}→ M5
M0, for(init, cond, step){body}→ M5
FORFALSE
M0, init → M1 M1, cond → (M2, false)
M0, for(init, cond, step){body}→ M2
FIGURE 1.10 – Rules of the for loop in Big-Step
Conversely, Figure 1.11 shows the 6 rules needed to handle the for loop in
Pretty-Big-Step style. They introduce intermediate terms for1, for2 and for3.
They do not have the parameter init since these new terms corresponds to
the loop phases.
FOR
M, init → σ σ, for1(cond, step){body}→ σ�
M, for(init, cond, step){body}→ σ �
FOR1
M, cond → σ σ, for2(cond, step){body}→ σ�
M, for1(cond, step){body}→ σ�
FOR2TRUE
M, body → σ σ, for3(cond, step){body}→ σ�
(M, true), for2(cond, step){body}→ σ�
FOR2FALSE
(M, false), for2(cond, step){body}→ M
FOR3
M, step → σ σ, for1(cond, step){body}→ σ�
M, for3(cond, step){body}→ σ�
FIGURE 1.11 – Rules of the for loop in Pretty-Big-Step
To derive the rule FOR, one needs to ﬁrst evaluate the initialization init
and then for1 as the continuation. This ﬁrst extended term is evaluated with
the rule FOR1 which evaluates the condition and then lets the term for2
decide to take the loop or not depending on the value calculated. The term
for2 has then 2 ways to be evaluated : either the extra is true and in that
case the rule FOR2TRUE applies or it is false and then the rule FOR2FALSE
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applies. In the ﬁrst case, the program enters in the loop evaluating body and
letting for3 taking care of ending the loop. In the second case there is no
computation left and the loop ends here. Once the body is executed, the rule
FOR3 proceeds to evaluate the step statement and continues with the same
continuation as after the initialization : for1.
It is important to note that, despite the increasing number of rules, the
number of inductive premises stays approximately the same : 7 premises in
Big-Step and 8 in Pretty-Big-Step.
Let us extend the language with an error exception and commands to
throw and catch this error and compare the changes to operate in Big-Step
and in Pretty-Big-Step.
Error handling in Big-Step
In the Big-Step version, we suppose we have the rules of Figure 1.12 to throw
and catch errors.
THROW
M, throw → (M, err)
TRYCATCH
M, body → (M �, err) M �, serror → σ�
M, try body catch serror → σ�
TRYNOCATCH
M, body → σ� σ� �= (M �, err)
M, try body catch serror → σ�
FIGURE 1.12 – Rules of throw and catch Big-Step style
To handle the interaction of errors with loops, one needs to add the 5
rules of Figure 1.13. Each rule corresponds to a step that could throw an
error during the evaluation : the initialization, the condition, the body, the step
and the next loops. We added 5 rules with a total of 15 premises.
Error handling in Pretty-Big-Step
In Pretty-Big-Step, it is way simpler because the structure allows to propagate
the errors between each intermediate step thanks to the extra. First let us give
the rules to throw and catch errors in Figure 1.14
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FORERR1
M0, init → (M1, err)
M0, for(init, cond, step){body}→ (M1, err)
FORERR2
M0, init → M1 M1, cond → (M2, err)
M0, for(init, cond, step){body}→ (M2, err)
FORERR3
M0, init → M1
M1, cond → (M2, true) M2, body → (M3, err)
M0, for(init, cond, step){body}→ (M3, err)
FORERR4
M0, init → M1 M1, cond → (M2, true)
M2, body → M3 M3, step → (M4, err)
M0, for(init, cond, step){body}→ (M4, err)
FORERR5
M0, init → M1
M1, cond → (M2, true) M2, body → M3 M3, step → M4
M4, for(skip, cond, step){body}→ (M5, err)
M0, for(init, cond, step){body}→ (M5, err)
FIGURE 1.13 – Extra rules about for/catch interaction (BS)
THROW
M, throw → (M, err) TRY
M, body → σ σ, catch serror → σ�
M, try body catch serror → σ�
CATCH
M, serror → σ�
(M, err), catch serror → σ�
NOCATCH
lextra �= [err]
(M, lextra), catch serror → M
FIGURE 1.14 – Rules of throw and catch Pretty-Big-Step style
Now to handle the interactions of errors with other terms, we need to add
the rule of Figure 1.15 for every rule 2 over a term t and with t1 as term for
the ﬁrst subderivation, excepted for the rule TRY.
In any rule 2, when an error occurs in the left branch, the rule ERR auto-
matically propagates the error without having to evaluate the continuation. If
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ERR
up(σ), t1 → (M, err)
σ, t → (M, err)
FIGURE 1.15 – Extra rules about for/catch interaction (PBS)
an error appears in the subderivation of a rule 1, the error is naturally trans-
mitted to the result. In the case of the loop it corresponds to a total of 4
additional rules and only 4 premises.
On one hand, the adding of the new rules in Pretty-Big-Step is way simpler
since it matches the total number of rules 2 whereas in Big-Step many rules
need to be added to manage errors in a rule with more than two premises.
On the other hand, the additional rules in PBS are fewer and smaller in terms
of premises because there is no redundant subderivation in different rules.
Abstraction
The second advantage is that Pretty-Big-Step is really easy to abstract. Our
formalization is stricter than Charguéraud initial version of Pretty-Big-Step.
The extra part, which Charguéraud included in the subterm to evaluate, is
now in the state. It allows to fully deﬁne each rule by a strict scheme depen-
ding on which kind of rule it is (axiom, Rule1 or Rule2). We will see in Chapter
2 that we can work with a Pretty-Big-Step language without concretizing the
terms of the language, only considering the structure of the rules. This is an
important property since it allow any language to ﬁt in our work at the only
condition that it is written in Pretty-Big-Step form.
1.3.3 A While language in PBS
To illustrate our approach, we introduce a small WHILE language suitable
for non-interference. It is a classical WHILE language with input/output com-
mands to receive and send data. We ﬁrst give the syntax of the language and
then its semantics in Pretty-Big-Step form.
Memory model We propose to model non-interference by making explicit
the inputs of a program and its outputs. We do not consider interactive pro-
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grams, so each input is a constant single value, for instance an argument
of the program. Outputs, however, consist of lists of values, as we allow a
program to send several values to a given output.
Formally, we consider given a set of values Val, a set of variables Var ,
a set of inputs Inputs and a set of outputs Outputs. We deﬁne the memory
as a triplet (Ei, Ex, Eo), where Ei ∈ Envi represents the inputs of a program
as a read-only mapping from each input to a value, Ex ∈ Envx represents
run-time environment as a read-write mapping from each variable to a value,
and Eo ∈ Envo represents the outputs of a program, as a write-only mapping
of each output to a list of values, accumulated in the output. To simplify, we
consider inputs and outputs to be indexed by an integer.
Envi := Inputs �→ Val
Envx := Var �→ Val
Envo := Outputs �→ List(Val)
Mem := Envi × Envx × Envo
Extra := List(Val)
State := Mem × Extra
For the purpose of notation, when there is no ambiguity, memories and
states may be seen has functions from Inputs, Var , or Outputs to Val or
List(Val) to represent the part of the memory that should be used. For
example, the value stored in the variable x in a memory M or a state σ may
be written M(x) or σ(x).
Syntax In this language, we distinguish expressions and statements but
they formally both are deﬁned as terms. An expression is either a constant
value, a variable, an input, or the addition of two expressions. A statement is
either a no-op operation skip, a sequence of two statements, a conditional, a
while loop, an assignment of an expression into a variable, or an assignment
of an expression into an output.
�term� t : := Const n | Var x | Input i | Plus t t | Skip | Seq t t | If t t t |
While t t | Assign x t | Output o t
We add to the language the extended terms required by the Pretty-Big-
Step format.
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�term� t : := . . . | Plus1 t | Plus2 | Seq1 t | If1 t t | While1 t t | While2 t t
| Assign1 x | Output1 o
Semantics The difference between expressions and statements is at the
semantic level where expressions always return a value, while statements
may do so (the if statement for example) but it is not always the case.
To simplify the reading of the rules and the examples, we use some usual
notations :
c for Const c
x for Var x
e1 + e2 for Plus1 e2
+1 e2 for Plus2
+2 for Plus e1 e2
s1; s2 for Seq s1 s2
;1 s2 for Seq1 s2
x := e for Assign x e
x :=1 for Assign1 x
if e then s1 else s2 for If e s1 s2
If1 s1 s2 for If1 s1 s2
while e do s for While e s
while1 e do s for While1 e s
while2 e do s for While2 e s
To evaluate a constant c the axiom CST requires the semantic context to
be a memory and an empty extra, and returns a result formed by the same
memory and an extra containing the value c. The rule VAR looks up for the
value stored in x and returns a state made of the memory unmodiﬁed and
the value found. The rule INPUT works exactly the same way but in the input
environment.
The addition e1 + e2 of two expressions is managed by three rules PLUS,
PLUS1 and PLUS2. The ﬁrst one is a rule 2 in which the ﬁrst premise derives
the ﬁrst expression e1 and the result of this derivation becomes the semantic
context of the second premise. This second premise is the derivation of +1 e2
and requires the rule PLUS1. This rule is also a rule 2 : its ﬁrst premise is
the derivation of e2 and its second premise is the derivation of +2. The extra
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of the current rule (corresponding to the value of the ﬁrst expression e1) is
added to the extra in the result of the derivation of e2 to form the semantic
context of the continuation. Finally, the axiom PLUS2 can add the two values
currently in the extra to produce the ﬁnal sum.
To derive the skip, the rule SKIP needs a state with an empty extra and
returns the same state.
The sequence is derived with the rules SEQ and SEQ1. The ﬁrst rule is a
rule 2 that derives the ﬁrst statement and passes the result to the continuation
;1. Then the second rule is a rule 1 simply deriving the second statement.
In the rule IF, the derivation of if e then s1 else s2 starts with the deri-
vation of the guarding condition e. The result is passed to the extended sta-
tement If1 s1 s2. We then have two rules to evaluate If1 s1 s2, one for each
possible extra. The ﬁrst one, IFTRUE, is a rule 1 in which the premise is the
derivation of the ﬁrst branch granted that the value in the extra is true. The
second one, IFFALSE, derives the second branch when the extra is false.
The rules to derive while e do s are similiar to those to derive an if sta-
tement. First the rule WHILE derives the guarding condition. Then two cases
can appear. Either we have to derive while1 e do s in a state with an extra
containing false and in that case the axiom WHILEFALSE simply returns the
state without the extra. Or we have to derive the extended term in a state with
true in the extra and then ﬁrstly the rule WHILETRUE1 derives the body of the
loop and lets the continuation while2 e do s decide the remaining derivations
to do, secondly the rule WHILETRUE2 branches back to the beginning of the
loop deriving again while e do s.
An assignment x := e is derived by the rule 2 ASG that derives the ex-
pression e and gives the result to the continuation x :=1. This extended term
can be derived by the rule ASG1 in an state containing a value v in the extra.
The resulting state is the same than the semantic context with v stored in x
instead of the previous value.
The output Ouput o e of an expression e to an output o is similar : ﬁrst
the rule OUTPUT derives the expression to get its value and gives it to the
continuation, then the continuation is derived with the rule OUTPUT1 which
adds the value of the extra to the list of values already output by o.
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CST
M, c → (M, c) VAR
M(x) = v
M, x → (M, v) INPUT
M(i) = v
M, Input i → (M, v)
PLUS
M, e1 → (M �, v1) (M �, v1), +1 e2 → (M ��, v)
M, e1 + e2 → (M ��, v)
PLUS1
M, e2 → (M �, v2) (M �, [v1, v2]), +2 → M ��, v
(M, v1), +1 e2 → M ��, v
PLUS2
v = v1 + v2
(M, [v1, v2])), +2 → (M, v)
SKIP
M, skip → M
SEQ
M, s1 → M � M �, ;1 s2 → M ��
M, s1; s2 → M ��
SEQ1
M, s → M �
M, ;1 s → M �
IF
M, e → (M �, v) (M �, v), If1 s1 s2 → M ��
M, if e then s1 else s2 → M ��
IFTRUE
M, s1 → M �
(M, true), If1 s1 s2 → M �
IFFALSE
M, s2 → M �
(M, false), If1 s1 s2 → M �
FIGURE 1.16 – Rules of WHILE (1)
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WHILE
M, e → (M �, v) (M �, v), while1 e do s → M ��
M, while e do s → M ��
WHILEFALSE
(M, false), while1 e do s → M
WHILETRUE1
M, s → M � M �, while2 e do s → M ��
(M, true), while1 e do s → M ��
WHILETRUE2
M, while e do s → M �
M, while2 e do s → M �
ASG
M, e → (M �, v) (M �, v), x :=1→ M ��
M, x := e → M �� ASG1
M � = M [x �→ v]
(M, v), x :=1→ M �
OUTPUT
M, e → (M �, v) (M �, v), Ouput1 o → M ��
M, Ouput o e → M ��
OUTPUT1
M � = M [o �→ v :: M(o)]
(M, v), Ouput1 o → M �
FIGURE 1.17 – Rules of WHILE (2)
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GENERIC FORMAT OF SEMANTICS
2.1 Motivation
As we stated before, we want our framework to work on a large variety of
languages. The only constraints we enforce is that the languages semantics
must be written in PBS form. It allows our framework to be independent of
any language.
In order to be able to ﬁt any PBS semantic in this work, we developed a
formal PBS structure in which the three types of rules are formally deﬁned. It
gives the possibility to think of any language only in terms of axioms, rules 1
and rules 2 ; and to totally abstract the proofs from any particular language.
One other main reason to this choice is that JavaScript is widely used
in browser and web application (which are uses for which non-interference
makes sense to study) and already has a PBS semantics called JScert [13].
This semantics is a huge inductive deﬁnition with more than 800 rules and
hinders formal proofs as Coq runs out of memory when performing an inver-
sion or an induction.
Moreover, given a PBS semantic of any language in this formalism, we
want to automatically derive the associated multisemantics that we will build
in section 3.
2.2 Formal Pretty-Big-Step
2.2.1 Abstract PBS
We ﬁrst deﬁne what a syntax is. It simply consists of terms and values.
Such a syntax can be assumed by the use of type classes.
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Class AbstractSyntax := {
Term : Type;
Value : Type
}.
Context {Syntax : AbstractSyntax}.
Now that we have some terms and values, we can deﬁne variables as
strings and then describe our memory model as in subsection 1.3.3. A State
is made of 4 parts : a memory for the inputs, one for the variables, a last one
for the outputs, and the extra.
Definition variable : Type := string.
Definition input : Type := string.
Definition output : Type := string.
Record State :=
mkState
{
Envi : input -> Value; (* input environment *)
Envx : variable -> option value; (* variable environment *)
Envo : output -> list value; (* output environment *)
extra : list value (* extra *)
}
.
Once the memory model is deﬁned, we have the ability to formally deﬁne
the PBS rules. There are three kinds of rules :
1. To entirely deﬁne an axiom, we exactly need the term t on which it
applies and the function ax returning the resulting state ; for the purpose
of capturing non-interference by the multisemantics we also add four
sets and a boolean value : 2 sets for the inputs and variables read by
the axiom, 2 sets for the variables and outputs written by the axiom and
a boolean value to specify if the axiom produces an extra or if it returns
an empty one. These parameters are not mandatory for a PBS but they
will be used and explained in a more detailed way in chapter 4.
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2. A Rule 1 is deﬁned by the term t on which it applies, the term t1 needed
to derive, and the function up returning the semantic context in which t1
must be derived.
3. And a Rule 2 is deﬁned by the term t on which it applies, the terms t1
and t2 that need to be derived, the function up returning the semantic
context in which t1 must be derived and the function next returning the
semantic context in which t2 must be derived.
Inductive rule :=
| Ax : Term (*t*)
-> (State -> option State) (*ax*)
-> fset input (*Inputs read*)
-> fset variable (*Variables read*)
-> fset variable (*Variables written*)
-> fset output (*Outputs written*)
-> bool (*extra produced*)
-> rule
| R1 : Term (*t*)
-> Term (*t1*)
-> (State -> option State) (*up*)
-> rule
| R2 : Term (*t*)
-> Term (*t1*)
-> Term (*t2*)
-> (State -> option State) (*up*)
-> (State -> State -> option State) (*next*)
-> rule
.
Now that we gave a structure to our rule format we can formally deﬁne
a semantics, i.e. a function giving, for each term, a list of rules that can be
applied to the term. As for syntax, let us assume we have a semantics.
Class AbstractSemantics := {
Rules : Term -> list rule
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}.
Context {Semantics : AbstractSemantics}.
The deﬁnition of a derivation is now possible. A derivation of term t from
the semantic context σ to the result out is deﬁned inductively with these 3
cases :
Inductive deriv (t:Term) (sigma:State) (out:State) : Prop :=
1. if there is axiom R in the semantics such that ax(σ) = Some out
| deriv_Ax R ax ri rx wx wo pe
(eqR : R = Ax t ax ri rx wx wo pe)
(isRule : List.In R (Rules t))
(eqAx : ax sigma = Some out)
: (* ======== *)
deriv t sigma out
2. if there is a rule 1 R in the semantics and a state σ1, such that up(σ) =
Some σ1 and there is a derivation of t1 from σ1 to out.
| deriv_R1 R t1 up sigma1
(eqR : R = R1 t t1 up)
(isRule : List.In R (Rules t))
(eqUp : up sigma = Some sigma1)
(STEP : deriv t1 sigma1 out)
: (* ======== *)
deriv t sigma out
3. if there is a rule 2 R in the semantics and three states σ�, out� and σ��
such that up(σ) = Some σ�, there is a derivation of t1 from σ� to out�,
next(σ, out�) = Some σ�� and there is a derivation of t2 from σ�� to out.
| deriv_R2 R t1 t2 up next sigma’ out’ sigma’’
(eqR : R = R2 t t1 t2 up next)
(isRule : List.In R (Rules t))
(eqUp : up sigma = Some sigma’)
(STEP1 : deriv t1 sigma’ out’)
(eqNext : next sigma out’ = Some sigma’’)
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(STEP2 : deriv t2 sigma’’ out)
: (* ======== *)
deriv t sigma out
.
2.2.2 Concretization of the WHILE language
To illustrate a concretization of a pbs language, we formalize the while
language described in subsection 1.3.3. Values and Terms are deﬁned in-
ductively. Values are either integer or boolean.
Inductive Concr_value : Type :=
| Num (z:Z)
| Bool (b:bool)
.
Inductive Concr_Term: Type :=
(*Statements*)
| Skip : Concr_Term
| Seq : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Seq1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| If : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| If1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| While : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| While1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| While2 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Assign : variable -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Assign1 : variable -> Concr_Term
| Out : output -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Out1 : output -> Concr_Term
(*Expressions*)
| Var : variable -> Concr_Term
| Cons : Concr_value -> Concr_Term
| Plus : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
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| Plus1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Plus2 : Concr_Term
| In : input -> Concr_Term
.
These values and terms form our syntax :
Instance Concr_Syntax : AbstractSyntax:=
{
Value := Concr_value;
Term := Concr_Term
}.
We only describe here the rules for the Skip, If, Out, Var, Plus and In
terms. The complete Coq code can be found in Appendix A. The appendix
also shows 3 functions to change the extra of a state (update_extra), to
modify the value of a variable (update_var) or an output (update_output).
The rules are given by a function returning, for each term, a list of rules that
can be applied to it.
Definition Concr_Rules (t:Concr_Term): list rule :=
match t with
The only rule for the term Skip is an axiom : the term it applies on is of
course Skip. The ax function is a partial function deﬁned only if the extra is
empty : if it is empty, ax returns the semantic context as the result and if it
is not ax returns None to illustrate that there is no possible derivation. All of
the sets are empty since the rule does not read or write any input, variable or
output. Additionally, this rule does not produce an extra therefore the boolean
value is false.
| Skip => (Ax Skip
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
empty empty empty empty
false)
:: nil
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The term If e s_1 s_2 cannot be directly derived with an axiom and
needs other derivations. The rule for the if statement is a rule 2 in which
the ﬁrst term to derive is the guard e and the second one is the extended
term if1 s1 s2. The partial function up is deﬁned only if the extra of the seman-
tic context is empty and in that case, it returns the same semantic context for
the guard. On the other hand, next is deﬁned only if up is deﬁned and if the
extra of the ﬁrst derivation’s result is a singleton containing a boolean value.
In that case next returns the result of the ﬁrst derivation as semantic context
for the If1 statement. Note that this mechanism allows the presence of side
effects to the memory during the derivation of the guard.
| If e s1 s2 => (R2 (If e s1 s2)
(e)
(If1 s1 s2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, (Bool _) :: nil => Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
Once the guard has been evaluated and stored in the extra, the term
if1 s1 s2 can be derived in two possible ways depending on the value stored.
Therefore, there are two rules for this term. Both rules are rule 1 and they
can only be applied when the extra of the semantic context contains nothing
more than a boolean value. If the boolean is true, the ﬁrst rule applies and
it considers s1 for the inductive derivation. In the other case, the second rule
applies and it considers s2. Both up functions keep the memories unchanged
and replace the extra by an empty list.
| If1 s1 s2 => (R1 (If1 s1 s2)
(s1)
(fun sc => (match extra sc with
| (Bool true) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
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| _ => None end)))
::
(R1 (If1 s1 s2)
(s2)
(fun sc => (match extra sc with
| (Bool false) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
| _ => None end)))
:: nil
To output an expression e on o, a rule 2 applies : ﬁrst derive e and then
Out1 o. The up partial function requires an empty extra in the semantic context
and returns the same state. The next function additionally requires that the
extra of the ﬁrst derivation’s result is a singleton and returns the result of the
ﬁrst derivation.
| Out o e=> (R2 (Out o e)
(e)
(Out1 o)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, v :: nil => Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
Then to derive the extended term Out1 o the rule to apply is the following
axiom. The ax partial function is deﬁned provided that the extra in the seman-
tic context contains only one value v and it returns the same state but with v
added to the output o and an empty extra. In that case, the axiom does not
read any input or variable and neither it writes into a variable ; but it writes
into the output o thus the fourth set is the singleton {o}. Since this axiom
only sends the value in the output o, it does not produce a value in the extra.
therefore the boolean value is set to false.
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| Out1 o => (Ax (Out1 o)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| v::nil =>
Some (update_extra
(update_output sc o v)
nil)
| _ => None end)
empty empty empty (singleton o)
false)
:: nil
The term Var x also has only one rule that can be applied. It is an axiom
for which the ax function requires two things on the semantic context : ﬁrst,
the extra should be empty and second, x should contain some value v in
the variable environment (i.e. x must store something of the form Some v). If
this is the case, ax returns the same states but with a list containing only the
value v as extra. The rule only reads the variable x and does not write into the
memory, all the sets are empty except for the set of the read variables which
is {x}. This is a rule that stores a value in the extra, therefore the boolean
value is set to true.
| Var x => (Ax (Var x)
(fun sc => match extra sc, Envx sc x with
| nil, Some v =>
Some (update_extra sc (v :: nil))
| _,_ => None end)
empty (singleton x) empty empty
true)
:: nil
The rule to derive an In statement is an axiom that simply requires the
semantic context to have an empty extra and the result is the same state as
the semantic context with the value value stored in the i input copied in the
extra. This rule obviously reads the input i and reads or writes nothing else
thus the corresponding set is {i}. This axiom also stores a value in the extra,
the boolean value is set to true.
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| In i => (Ax (In i)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil =>
Some (update_extra sc ((Envi sc i) :: nil))
| _ => None
end)
(singleton i) empty empty empty
true)
:: nil
This last example illustrate a case in which the extra has more than one
elements in the list. The term Plus e1 e2 can be derived by a unique rule 2 :
the two expression to derive are e1 and the extended term Plus1 e2. e1 has
to be derived in the same state than the initial state provided that the extra is
empty. Plus1 e2 has to be derived in the state resulting of the ﬁrst derivation,
provided that the extra contains only a value corresponding to a number.
| Plus e1 e2 => (R2 (Plus e1 e2)
(e1)
(Plus1 e2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, (Num _)::nil => Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
Plus1 e2 is also a rule 2 : the rule is similar to the previous one with
some differences on the extra. The condition to derive the rule is that the
extra contains a unique number n1, which is removed when deriving e2. But it
is reintroduced in the extra of the semantic context when deriving Plus2, with
the result n2 of the ﬁrst derivation.
| Plus1 e2 => (R2 (Plus1 e2)
(e2)
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(Plus2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| (Num _)::nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| (Num n1)::nil, (Num n2)::nil =>
Some (update_extra res
((Num n1)::(Num n2)::nil))
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
Finally, Plus2 is derived with an axiom : the ax function produces an un-
changed state except for the extra containing the sum of the two number
given in the initial extra. this axiom does not read or write in the memory at
all therefore the 4 sets are empty but the boolean value is true because the
rule produces a value in the extra.
| Plus2 => (Ax (Plus2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| (Num n1) :: (Num n2) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc
(Num (n1+n2) :: nil))
| _ => None end)
empty empty empty empty
true)
:: nil
end.
Once that all the rules are deﬁned the semantics can be concretized.
Instance Concr_Semantics : AbstractSemantics:= {
Rules := Concr_Rules
}.
Every theorem and property proved on the abstract PBS semantics is now
instantiable by this concrete semantics.
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2.3 Conclusion
We wanted to deﬁne a general way to describe a PBS semantic of a
language in order to have the capacity of reasoning only in terms of rule
types instead of having to reason directly on the rules. Additionally, it would
be a way to automatically produce different semantics than the original one
when given a particular language.
In this chapter we successfully formally deﬁned in Coq an abstract struc-
ture for a PBS language. We also gave an example of concretization of the
WHILE language we introduced in section 1.3.3. This abstract semantics will
be used in chapters 3 and 4 to automatically derive respectively the multise-
mantics and the annotated multisemantics.
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MULTISEMANTICS
The ﬁrst step of our approach is to derive a new semantics where several
derivations are considered at once. We do not simply want a set of deriva-
tions, but a multiderivation where applications of the same rule at the same
point in the derivation are shared.
3.1 Preliminary deﬁnitions
We need a few helper functions to deﬁne the multisemantics. First, we de-
ﬁne operators to extract the set of ﬁrst and second components of a relation.
Deﬁnition 2. fst and snd are deﬁned for all relation r :
fst(r) = {x | (x, y) ∈ r} snd(r) = {y | (x, y) ∈ r}
As an example, let’s consider the following relations r1 and r2 :
r1
x1
x2
x3
x4
y1
y2
y3
r2
y1
y2
y3
z1
z2
z3
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In this case,
fst(r1) = {x1, x2, x3}
snd(r1) = fst(r2) = {y1, y3}
snd(r2) = {z1, z2, z3}
Second, we deﬁne a strict relation composition operator ◦. This operator is
associative and propagates undeﬁnedness, so we avoid using parentheses.
The reason why we only allow strict compositions is that we want to forbid the
composition of two non-empty relations that would result in an empty relation.
An example of what could happen is given in chapter 4.
Deﬁnition 3. For all relations r1 and r2 :
r1 ◦ r2 =



{(x, z)|∃y, (x, y) ∈ r1 ∧ (y, z) ∈ r2} if snd(r1) = fst(r2)
undeﬁned otherwise
In the previous example, since snd(r1) = fst(r2), r1 ◦ r2 is deﬁned and it
is the relation
r1 ◦ r2
x1
x2
x3
x4
z1
z2
z3
Third, we deﬁne an operator on relations −→· that takes a relation and re-
turns a new relation where the left-hand side is remembered in the right-hand
side.
Deﬁnition 4. For all relation r :
−→r = {(σ, (σ,σ�1)) | (σ,σ�1) ∈ r}
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The following example illustrates this operator with the previous r1 rela-
tion.
−→r1
x1
x2
x3
x4
x1, y1
x1, y2
x1, y3
x2, y1
x2, y2
x2, y3
x3, y1
x3, y2
x3, y3
x4, y1
x4, y2
x4, y3
Finally, for every partial function f : E → F , we deﬁne the relation �f|S ∈
E × F between any element of S ⊆ E and its image by f if it exists.
Deﬁnition 5. For all function f : E → F and set S ⊆ E,
�f|S =



{(x, f(x)) |x ∈ S} if S ⊂ Dom(f)
undeﬁned otherwise
To illustrate this deﬁnition, we consider S = {x1, x2} and f the function
representing the relation r1, i.e. :
f(x1) = y1
f(x2) = y1
f(x3) = y3
x4 has no image
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Since S = {x1, x2} ⊂ Dom(f) = {x1, x2, x3}, �f|S is deﬁned and it is the
relation :
�f|S
x1
x2
x3
x4
y1
y2
y3
3.2 Canonical structure
We use the notation t ⇓ µ to represent a multiderivation where µ ⊆ State×
State is a relation between states. From now on, we refer to such a µ as a
multistate. Intuitively, a multistate relates semantic contexts and results of a
derivation of the considered term t. Formally, for every pair (σ,σ�) ∈ µ, we
should have σ, t → σ�, which is a property of the multisemantics that we state
and prove in Section 3.3.
Figure 3.1 shows how to derive a rule in the multisemantics from a rule in
PBS style. There are three cases as there are three kinds of PBS rules. For
each case, t1, t2, up, and next come from the corresponding PBS rule.
MLTAX
µ = �ax|fst(µ) µ �= ∅
t ⇓ µ MLTR1
t1 ⇓ µ1 µ = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1
t ⇓ µ
MLTR2
t1 ⇓ µ1 t2 ⇓ µ2 µ� = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1 µ =
−→
µ� ◦ �next
|snd(
−→
µ�)
◦ µ2
t ⇓ µ
FIGURE 3.1 – Translation of Pretty-Big-Step to multisemantics
In order to derive an axiom, the multistate should be consistent with the ax
function : for every pair (σ,σ�) of the multistate, ax(σ) = σ�. We forbid µ to be
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empty because it would correspond to multiderivations that have no meaning.
In fact, we will see in chapter 4 that it could even induce wrong annotations.
Deriving a rule 1 with some µ can be done if µ1 is such that for every pair
(σ,σ�) in the multistate µ, there exists a state σ1 such that up(σ) = σ1 and
(σ1,σ
�) is a pair of the multistate µ1. The composition is strict so every state
of fst(µ1) must be of the form up(σ) with σ ∈ fst(µ).
To derive a rule 2, we illustrate with a µ such that fst(µ) = {σ˜, ˜˜σ, ˜˜˜σ}. We
introduce a multistate µ� relating the semantic context of the derivation with
the results of the ﬁrst premise. The strict composition enforces that every
state of fst(µ1) must be of the form up(σ) with σ ∈ fst(µ) and also that for
every σ ∈ fst(µ), up(σ) ∈ fst(µ1). We choose to illustrate µ1 as if t1 had the
same behaviour in the states up(˜˜σ) and up(˜˜˜σ)
�up|fst(µ)
σ˜
˜˜σ
˜˜˜σ
up(σ˜)
up(˜˜σ)
up(˜˜˜σ)
µ1
up(σ˜)
up(˜˜σ)
up(˜˜˜σ)
σ˜�1
˜˜σ�1
Thus µ� and
−→
µ� are
µ�
σ˜
˜˜σ
˜˜˜σ
σ˜�1
˜˜σ�1
−→
µ�
σ˜
˜˜σ
˜˜˜σ
(σ˜, σ˜�1)
(˜˜σ, ˜˜σ�1)
(˜˜˜σ, ˜˜σ�1)
Then, every state of fst(µ2) must be of the form next(σ,σ�1) with
(σ,σ�1) ∈ snd(
−→
µ� ) and also for every (σ,σ�1) ∈ snd(
−→
µ� ), next(σ,σ�1) ∈ fst(µ2).
We choose to illustrate µ2 in a case where next(σ,σ�1) = σ
�
1.
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µ2
next(σ˜, σ˜�1) = σ˜
�
1
next(˜˜σ, ˜˜σ�1) = ˜˜σ
�
1
next(˜˜˜σ, ˜˜σ�1) = ˜˜σ
�
1
σ˜�
˜˜σ�
Finally, µ is the multistate
µ�
σ˜
˜˜σ
˜˜˜σ
σ˜�
˜˜σ�
These rules are not sufﬁcient in the general case as they force every
derivation to have the same structure. For example, when trying to derive
an if statement in the multisemantics, all of the derivations have to go in the
same branch. The multiderivation for a conditional has the following root.
MLTIF
b ⇓ µ1
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ2 µ� = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1 µ =
−→
µ� ◦ �next
|snd(
−→
µ�)
◦ µ2
if b then s1 else s2 ⇓ µ
To derive If1 s1 s2 there are two options. Either
MLTIFTRUE
s1 ⇓ µ1 µ = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ
where �up|fst(µ) = {((M, true), M) | (M, true) ∈ fst(µ)} and then fst(µ) only
contains states of the form (M, true), or
MLTIFFALSE
s2 ⇓ µ2 µ = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ2
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ
where �up|fst(µ) = {((M, false), M) | (M, false) ∈ fst(µ)} and then fst(µ)
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only contains states of the form (M, false).
As those options are incompatible, it is impossible to have a multideriva-
tion for a conditional where the guard is evaluated differently for some states.
To ﬁx this, we add a MERGE rule. This rule simply states that if it is pos-
sible to derive a term with two multistates, then it is also possible to derive it
from the union of them. In the case of an if statement, one may thus use two
subderivations, one for each status of the guard, and merge them together.
MERGE
t ⇓ µ1 t ⇓ µ2
t ⇓ µ1 ∪ µ2
FIGURE 3.2 – The Merge rule
We do not restrict the use of the MERGE rule but in practice, we only
use it when we need to apply different rules to a multistate. For example the
evaluation of a conditional could look like the following derivation.
MLTIF
b ⇓ µ1
MERGE
s1 ⇓ µ�true
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µtrue
s2 ⇓ µ�false
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µfalse
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ2
if b then s1 else s2 ⇓ µ
with the conditions :
µ =
−→
µ� ◦ �next
|snd(
−→
µ�)
◦ µ2
µ� = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1
µ2 = µtrue ∪ µfalse
µtrue = �up|fst(µtrue) ◦ µ�true
µfalse = �up|fst(µfalse) ◦ µ�false
where each up and next function is the one corresponding to the rule
where the condition appears.
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3.3 Properties
We now prove properties that show that multiderivations correspond to
multiple derivations. First, if t ⇓ µ is derivable, then for every pair (σ,σ�) ∈ µ,
σ, t → σ� is derivable. A proof by induction on the multiderivation is straight-
forward.
Lemma 1. ∀tµ. t ⇓ µ =⇒ ∀(σ,σ�) ∈ µ. σ, t → σ�
The converse implication is not true, however. Consider the following pro-
gram
n := In "argument";
i := 0;
While (i<n) do
i := i + 1
This an example of a program allowing PBS derivations of arbitrary size. For
every k ∈ N, a derivation starting with the value k in the input "argument"
needs to run k times the while loop. Each of these derivations is ﬁnite, but
considering all of them for k ∈ N together would require an inﬁnite multideri-
vation.
Nonetheless, when taking a ﬁnite number of PBS derivations, we are able
to derive them all together in the multisemantics. Using the fact that a ﬁnite
set can be described as the union of singletons (one for each element of the
set), we can prove it using Lemmas 2 and 3. The ﬁrst one states that if a
term is derivable in PBS then it is derivable in the multisemantics with the
corresponding singleton relation. The second lemma states that if a term is
derivable with two multistates then it is derivable with the union of them.
Lemma 2. ∀t,σ,σ�. σ, t → σ� =⇒ t ⇓ {(σ,σ�)}
Lemma 3. ∀t, µ1, µ2. t ⇓ µ1 =⇒ t ⇓ µ2 =⇒ t ⇓ µ1 ∪ µ2
Finite multistates are sufﬁcient for our purpose since ﬁnding interference
only requires two derivations (or equivalently : proving non-interference only
requires to inspect every pair of derivations).
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3.4 Multisemantics of WHILE
To illustrate a multisemantics, ﬁgures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 show the multise-
mantic rules for the WHILE language deﬁned in section 1.3.3. These rules
are automatically derived from the PBS and do not require to be deﬁned by
hand.
To simplify the reading, the conditions on the multistates are simpliﬁed
as follow. In most cases, up is the identity function on its domain. Therefore
�up|fst(µ) is the identity relation on fst(µ) and thus when �up|fst(µ)◦µ1 is deﬁned
�up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1 = µ1
If this is the case for a rule 1, then µ = µ1. And if this is the case for a rule 2,
then µ� = µ1.
Also, in some cases next is a function always returning the second argu-
ment (the result of the ﬁrst premise) and ignoring the ﬁrst one (the semantic
context of the conclusion) therefore we can simplify
−→
µ� ◦ �next|snd(µ�) = µ�
If this is the case for a rule 2, then µ = µ� ◦ µ2.
Figure 3.3 gathers the multisemantics rules for the expressions.
The MLTCST rule to derive a constant c requires µ to be a multistate re-
lating memories with states containing the same memory and only c in the
extra. Deriving a variable x, the rule MLTVAR is similar to the previous rule :
it requires µ to relate memories with the same memory paired with the value
of x in this memory.
In the rule MLTPLUS, up is the identity function and next returns the se-
cond argument, we can then simplify the equalities with the above remarks
and the condition on µ becomes µ = µ1◦µ2. It makes sense since the seman-
tic context of the ﬁrst premise is exactly the same as the conclusion and the
semantic context of the second premise is the result of the ﬁrst premise. The
case of the MLTPLUS1 is more complex because the rule ignores the extra
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MLTCST
µ = {(M, (M, c)) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
c ⇓ µ
MLTVAR
µ = {(M, (M, M(x))) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
x ⇓ µ
MLTPLUS
e1 ⇓ µ1 +1 e2 ⇓ µ2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
e1 + e2 ⇓ µ
MLTPLUS1
e2 ⇓ µ1 +2 ⇓ µ2 µ� = {((M, v1), M) | (M, v1) ∈ µ} ◦ µ1
µ =
−→
µ� ◦ {(((M, v1), (M �, v2)), (M �, [v1, v2])) | ((M, v1), (M �, v2)) ∈ snd(
−→
µ� )} ◦ µ2
+1 e2 ⇓ µ
MLTPLUS2
µ = {((M, [v1, v2]), (M, v1 + v2)) | (M, [v1, v2]) ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
+2 ⇓ µ
MLTINPUT
µ = {(M, (M, M(i))) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
Input i ⇓ µ
FIGURE 3.3 – Rules of the WHILE multisemantics (expressions)
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in the ﬁrst premise and reconsiders it in the second premise. The semantic
context of the ﬁrst premise is not the one of the conclusion anymore ; moreo-
ver the semantic context of the second premise is not the result of the ﬁrst
premise either. In that case µ� is the composition of a relation forgetting the
extra (deﬁned on the same ﬁrst part as µ) and µ1. Then µ is the composition
of three relations :
•
−→
µ� , the same relation as µ� but with the ﬁrst part remembered in the
second part ;
• {(((M, v1), (M
�, v2)), (M �, [v1, v2])) | ((M, v1), (M �, v2)) ∈ snd(
−→
µ� )}, a re-
lation relating a pair of states with the same state as the second one
but with the extra of the ﬁrst state added to the extra of the second
one ;
• and µ2.
To ﬁnalize the derivation of an addition, the rule MLTPLUS2 simply requires
µ to relate states containing two elements in the extra with states containing
the sum of those elements in the extra.
The last rule to derive an expression is the MLTINPUT rule. As for variable,
µ requires to relate memories with the same memory paired to the value of i
in this memory.
Figure 3.4 gathers the multisemantics rules for a ﬁrst subset of the state-
ments.
The term skip is derived thanks to the rule MLTSKIP requiring µ to be a
non-empty identity relation deﬁned at most over states with empty extra.
For the sequence, MLTSEQ and MLTSEQ1 verify the remarks we made
about up being identity functions and next returning the second argument,
therefore the equalities are straightforward.
The MLTIF is also straighforward because of the same remark. The two
rules to handle both possible continuations are similar : MLTIFTRUE requires
µ to be the strict composition of
• a relation relating states containing true in the extra with the same
state without extra,
• and the multistate µ1.
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MLTSKIP
µ = {(M, M) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
skip ⇓ µ
MLTSEQ
s1 ⇓ µ1 ;1 s2 ⇓ µ2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
s1; s2 ⇓ µ
MLTSEQ1
s ⇓ µ
;1 s ⇓ µ
MLTIF
e ⇓ µ1 If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
if e then s1 else s2 ⇓ µ
MLTIFTRUE
s1 ⇓ µ1 µ = {((M, true), M) | (M, true) ∈ fst(µ)} ◦ µ1
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ
MLTIFFALSE
s2 ⇓ µ1 µ = {((M, false), M) | (M, false) ∈ fst(µ)} ◦ µ1
If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ
MLTWHILE
e ⇓ µ1 while1 e do s ⇓ µ2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
while e do s ⇓ µ
MLTWHILEFALSE
µ = {((M, false), M) | (M, false) ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
while1 e do s ⇓ µ
MLTWHILETRUE1
s ⇓ µ1 while2 e do s ⇓ µ2
µ = {((M, true), M) | (M, true) ∈ fst(µ)} ◦ µ1 ◦ µ2
while1 e do s ⇓ µ
MLTWHILETRUE2
while e do s ⇓ µ
while2 e do s ⇓ µ
FIGURE 3.4 – Rules of the WHILE multisemantics (statements)
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while MLTIFFALSE has the same requirement when true is replaced by false.
The rule MLTWHILE is straighforward since up and next are how we des-
cribed them at the beginning of this section. To stop the while loop, the axiom
MLTWHILEFALSE forces µ to be a multistate relating state containing false
in the extra with the same state but containing an empty extra. In the rule
MLTWHILETRUE1, the next function can be simpliﬁed as in the remark above.
µ must then be the composition of
• a relation relating states containing false in the extra with the same
state without extra,
• µ1,
• and µ2.
The MLTWHILETRUE2 rule also has an identity up function, therefore the rule
is totally simpliﬁed.
Figure 3.5 gathers the remaining multisemantics rules for the statments.
The MLTASG rule also has an identity up function since the expression
is derived in the same semantic context as the assignment. Moreover the
semantic context of the continuation is the result of the derivation of the ex-
pression, thus we have µ = µ1 ◦ µ2 again. The continuation of this rule is
the axiom MLTASG1 which requires the multistate to be a relation between a
state containing a single value v and the same state with the variable x set to
v and an empty extra.
The MLTOUTPUT and MLTOUTPUT1 rules are analogous to the previous
MLTASG and MLTASG1 rules, except that the store does not erase previous
values.
Finally, the rule MERGE allows to gather two multiderivation of the same
term that may have different structures.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we gave a framework to build a new semantics when gi-
ven an initial semantics in Pretty-Big-Step form. This new semantic derives
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many executions of the same terms at once, and they share the same de-
rivation rule when they are at the same program point. This last property
gives us good hope in annotating the multisemantics in order to capture non-
interference.
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MLTASG
e ⇓ µ1 x :=1⇓ µ2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
x := e ⇓ µ
MLTASG1
µ = {((M, v), M [x �→ v]) | (M, v) ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
x :=1⇓ µ
MLTOUTPUT
e ⇓ µ1 Ouput1 o ⇓ µ2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
Ouput o e ⇓ µ
MLTOUTPUT1
µ = {((M, v), M [o �→ v :: M(o)]) | (M, v) ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
Ouput1 o ⇓ µ
MERGE
t ⇓ µ1 t ⇓ µ2 µ = µ1 ∪ µ2
t ⇓ µ
FIGURE 3.5 – Rules of the WHILE multisemantics (statements) (bis)

CHAPITRE 4
ANNOTATIONS
The multisemantics is a tool able to reason about many derivation with
one particularity : it can collect pieces of information from each derivation
and aggregate them at the same program point. This chapter focuses on an-
notating this semantics to capture the non-interference property and states
the correctness theorem of these annotations. This approach is not limited to
non-interference, it applies to any hyperproperty that requires a ﬁnite number
of derivations. We conjecture this methodology could be used to capture pro-
perties like nonmalleable non-interference [15] which needs four derivations.
4.1 Construction
The annotations track the inputs on which every variable and output de-
pends in a dependency environment of type MemDep, typically written D.
Additionally, we track the context dependency CD of the current computa-
tion. It has type CtxtDep, a set of inputs, and it represents the dependency
on the context in which the current expression or statement is evaluated. The
context dependency is used to track indirect ﬂows like program counter levels
do.
MemDep := (Var ∪ Outputs) �→ Inputs set CtxtDep := Inputs set
An annotated derivation of a term t in a multistate µ is written
CD, D, t ⇓ µ, D�, V D�
where CD ∈ CtxtDep is the context dependency and D ∈ MemDep is the
environment dependency before the execution. D� ∈ MemDep is the envi-
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ronment dependency after the execution of the term. V D� ∈ CtxtDep is the
set of inputs the computed value, i.e., the extra, depends on. We will refer
to CD and D as the entering dependencies and to D� and V D� as resul-
ting dependencies. The way to interpret such a statement is "given entering
dependencies CD and D, the derivation of t in the multistate µ returns the
resulting dependencies D� and V D�".
As stated in section 2.2.1, we suppose we are given, for each axiom,
4 sets representing the inputs, variables and outputs it may read or write
and a parameter specifying if the axiom produces an extra. Formally, each
axiom comes with four sets and a boolean value : InputRead ⊂ Inputs,
the set of inputs the axiom may read ; V arRead ⊂ Var , the set of variables
the axiom may read ; V arWrite ⊂ Var , the set of variables the axiom may
write ; OutputWrite ⊂ Outputs, the set of outputs the axiom may write ;
ProduceExtra, a boolean value specifying if the axiom produces an extra. In-
formally, the extra can be see as a variable : adding the extra in the set of the
elements the axiom can write on corresponds to a binary choice represen-
ted by ProdExtra. This analogy also works for reading the extra, considering
that an axiom always reads the extra there is no need to introduce another
boolean.
In practice these sets are empty sets or singletons because
axioms are generally atomic operations modifying and
using a small part of the memory. When having an axiom
Ax t ax InputRead V arRead V arWrite OutputWrite ProdExtra, these
parameters respect the following hypotheses.
1. If two states agree on the extra, InputRead, and V arRead, then for
every x ∈ V arWrite, the value in x after the axiom is the same in both
states.
Hypothesis 1. Membership of VarWrite
∀σ1σ2,



extra(σ1) = extra(σ2)
σ1(InputRead) = σ2(InputRead)
σ1(V arRead) = σ2(V arRead)
=⇒ ∀x ∈ V arWrite, ax(σ1)(x) = ax(σ2)(x)
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2. Every variable x such that x �∈ V arWrite is not modiﬁed by the axiom.
Hypothesis 2. Non-membership of VarWrite
∀σ,
∀x �∈ V arWrite,σ(x) = ax(σ)(x)
3. If two states agree on the extra, InputRead, and V arRead, then for
every o ∈ OutWrite, the values added to o after the axiom are the
same in both states.
Hypothesis 3. Membership of OutWrite
∀σ1σ2,



extra(σ1) = extra(σ2)
σ1(InputRead) = σ2(InputRead)
σ1(V arRead) = σ2(V arRead)
=⇒ ∀o ∈ OutWrite,∃lv,



ax(σ1)(o) = lv@σ1(o)
ax(σ2)(o) = lv@σ2(o)
4. Every output o such that o �∈ OutWrite is not modiﬁed by the axiom.
Hypothesis 4. Non-membership of OutWrite
∀σ,
∀x �∈ OutWrite,σ(o) = ax(σ)(o)
5. If two states agree on the extra, InputRead, and V arRead, then if an
extra is produced, the resulting extra is the same in both states.
Hypothesis 5. Producing an extra
∀σ1σ2,



extra(σ1) = extra(σ2)
σ1(InputRead) = σ2(InputRead)
σ1(V arRead) = σ2(V arRead)
prodExtra
=⇒ extra(ax(σ1)) = extra(ax(σ2))
6. If no extra is produced, then it should be an empty list.
Hypothesis 6. Not producing an extra
∀σ,
¬prodExtra =⇒ extra(ax(σ)) = nil
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These hypotheses are non-interference-like properties over the axioms
represented in terms of dependencies. Combining the annotations correctly
in the derivation will allow to lift that property over all the programs.
Hypotheses 2, 4 and 6 could be more precise and enforce the implications
to be double implications. We could rewrite them
∀x ∈ Var , x �∈ V arWrite ⇐⇒ ∀σ,σ(x) = ax(σ)(x)
∀o ∈ Outputs, o �∈ OutputWrite ⇐⇒ ∀σ,σ(o) = ax(σ)(o)
¬prodExtra ⇐⇒ ∀σ, extra(ax(σ)) = nil
Not verifying the right-to-left implications is not critical in terms of correct-
ness ; but it may induce a loss of precision in the annotations.
The annotated semantics rules in Figure 4.1 are the multisemantics rules
extended with annotation information.
Axioms The most complex case is the one for axioms. First consider the
set Deplocal of inputs involved in the axiom : it is the union of the current
context dependency, the inputs the axiom may read, and the dependencies
of the variables the axiom may read. For every variable written by the axiom,
we replace the dependency for that variable by Deplocal. Note that this is a
strong update : we throw away prior dependencies for that variable as it is
overwritten. In contrast, for every output written by the axiom, we keep the
old dependencies of the output and simply add Deplocal. The dependency
of the computed value is then Deplocal provided that there is one (which is
speciﬁed by produceExtra). If no extra is produced the value dependency set
is empty.
Rule 1 Rules 1 are simple to annotate : they propagate annotations. The
entering dependencies of the premise are exactly the entering dependen-
cies of the conclusion and the resulting dependencies of the conclusion are
exactly the resulting dependencies of the premise.
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AMLTAX
µ = �ax|fst(µ) µ �= ∅
CD, D, t ⇓ µ, D�, V D�
where Deplocal = CD ∪ InputRead
�
x∈V arRead
D(x)
V D� =



Deplocal if ProduceExtra
{} otherwise
,
∀x. D�(x) =



Deplocal if x ∈ V arWrite
D(x) otherwise
,
and ∀o. D�(o) =



Deplocal ∪ D(o) if o ∈ OutputWrite
D(o) otherwise
.
AMLTR1
CD, D, t1 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1 µ = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1
CD, D, t ⇓ µ, D1, V D1
AMLTR2
CD, D, t1 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1 CD ∪ V D1, D1, t2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
µ� = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1 µ =
−→
µ� ◦ �next
|snd(
−→
µ�)
◦ µ2
CD, D, t ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMERGE
CD, D, t ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1 CD, D, t ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
CD, D, t ⇓ µ1 ∪ µ2, D�, V D1 ∪ V D2
where D�(xo) = D1(xo) ∪ D2(xo) for all variable and output xo
FIGURE 4.1 – Types of rule for an annotated multisemantics
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Rule 2 The annotations for a Rule 2 exhibits the need of the parameter
produceExtra of the axioms. First the entering dependencies are propagated
to the ﬁrst derivation. Then, the context dependency of the continuation is
the union of the initial context dependency CD and the value dependency
of the ﬁrst derivation V D1. Note that, independently from the fact that the
ﬁrst derivation produces an extra or not, all side effects happening during the
derivation of t1 are stored in D1 and are taken into account in the continuation.
Let us take a closer look at the rule 2 to see where produceExtra impacts
the derivation.
AMLTR2
CD, D, t1 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1 CD ∪ V D1, D1, t2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
µ� = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1 µ =
−→
µ� ◦ �next
|snd(
−→
µ�)
◦ µ2
CD, D, t ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
If the derivation of t1 does not produce an extra and no over-approximation
has been done when parameterizing produceExtra in every axiom, then V D1
is empty. This can be proved by induction on the annotated derivation of t1 :
— In the case of an axiom, no approximation has been done, then
produceExtra is false. Therefore, V D1 = ∅.
— In the case of a rule 1, the result is immediate by induction since t1
produces an extra if and only if its premise produces an extra.
— In the case of a rule 2, the result is also immediate by induction on the
second derivation since t1 produces an extra if and only if its second
premise produces an extra.
— In the case of a merge rule, the induction hypothesis ensures that the
value dependencies are empty in both annotated derivation, therefore
their union is empty too.
We can then conclude that V D1 is empty which means that the context in
which t2 is derived only depends on CD as it is the case for the sequence
rule for example.
AMLTSEQ
CD, D, s1 ⇓ µ1, D1, {} CD, D1, ;1 s2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
µ� = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1 µ =
−→
µ� ◦ �next
|snd(
−→
µ�)
◦ µ2
CD, D, s1; s2 ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
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On the other hand, if the derivation produces an extra, then the dependen-
cies of that extra V D1 are added to the context dependencies to evaluate the
continuation. An example of the second case, where an extra is produced, is
the rule for conditionals.
AMLTIF
CD, D, b ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1 CD ∪ VD1, D1, If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
µ� = �up|fst(µ) ◦ µ1 µ =
−→
µ� ◦ �next
|snd(
−→
µ�)
◦ µ2
CD, D, if b then s1 else s2 ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
Merge rule Finally the Merge rule simply merges the dependencies toge-
ther by doing the point-wise union of the environment dependencies, and the
union of the value dependencies. For instance, for a conditional where both
branches are executed, the dependencies are the union of the dependencies
of each branch.
4.2 Annotated multisemantics of WHILE
The annotated rules of the WHILE multisemantics are the same as for the
simple multisemantics with additional information on the conclusion of the
rules. The premises stay the same. All the rules 1 and rules 2 are annotated
exactly like in the formal deﬁnition of the annotated multisemantics to stay
as modular as possible. For example, the rule AMLTSEQ could be simpliﬁed
because our WHILE language cannot produce an extra in the ﬁrst term s1.
This can be seen by looking at the next function for this rule and noticing that
next is only deﬁned if the resulting state of the ﬁrst derivation has an empty
extra. We could then take the remark we made previously and simplify the
rule. But adding the exception mechanism to the language would give the
possibility to produce a non empty extra in the derivation of s1 as we saw in
section 1.3.2 with the rule ERR.
Figure 4.2 gathers the annotated multisemantics rules for the expressions.
When deriving a constant, the memory is left untouched and the extra
(the value of the constant in that case) depends directly on the context. This
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AMLTCST
µ = {(M, (M, c)) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
CD, D, c ⇓ µ, D, CD
AMLTVAR
µ = {(M, (M, M(x))) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
CD, D, x ⇓ µ, D, CD ∪ D(x)
AMLTPLUS
CD, D, e1 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
CD ∪ V D1, D1, +1 e2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
CD, D, e1 + e2 ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTPLUS1
CD, D, e2 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1 CD ∪ V D1, D1, +2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
µ� = {((M, v1), M) | (M, v1) ∈ µ} ◦ µ1
µ =
−→
µ� ◦ {(((M, v1), (M �, v2)), (M �, [v1, v2])) | ((M, v1), (M �, v2)) ∈ snd(
−→
µ� )} ◦ µ2
CD, D, +1 e2 ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTPLUS2
µ = {((M, [v1, v2]), (M, v1 + v2)) | (M, [v1, v2]) ∈ fst(µ)}
µ �= ∅
CD, D, +2 ⇓ µ, D, CD
AMLTINPUT
µ = {(M, (M, M(i))) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
CD, D, Input i ⇓ µ, D, CD ∪ {i}
FIGURE 4.2 – Rules of the WHILE annotated multisemantics (expressions)
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is why the rule AMLTCST, when given a context dependency CD and an envi-
ronment dependency D, returns the same environment dependency and the
context dependency as value dependency. When deriving the rule AMLTVAR
with a variable x, the memory is also untouched and the extra depends on
the context and on every input x depends on.
To derive an addition, the rules AMLTPLUS and AMLTPLUS1 are not
axioms so their annotations are generic. The rule AMLTPLUS2, like
AMLTCST, does not depend on any variable or input and does not modify
the environment therefore the environment dependency is the same and the
value dependency is the context dependency.
The rule MLTINPUT only produces an extra and this extra only depends
on the input read. As for variable, environment dependencies do not change
and the value dependency is the context dependency plus the input read.
Figure 4.3 gathers the annotated multisemantics rules for a ﬁrst subset of the
statements.
The term skip does exactly nothing : the memory is not modiﬁed and no
extra is produced. Thus, the resulting environment dependency is the same
as the entering environment dependency and the value dependency is empty.
The sequence, the if statement and the while statement are handled
by rules 2 and rules 1 with their generic annotations excepted for the rule
AMLTWHILEFALSE. This rule does nothing more than checking that the ex-
tra is false but this has no impact on the dependencies. The environment
dependencies stay the same and the value dependency is empty.
Figure 4.4 gathers the remaining annotated multisemantics rules for the sta-
tements.
The rule AMLTASG is a rule 2 and has generic annotations. Its continua-
tion AMLTASG1 is an axiom that modiﬁes the content of the variable x and
does not return any extra. The value of x now depends only on the current
context. The resulting environment dependency is the previous one for which
the dependency associated to x has been changed to the current context
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AMLTSKIP
µ = {(M, M) | M ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
CD, D, skip ⇓ µ, D, ∅
AMLTSEQ
CD, D, s1 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
CD ∪ V D1, D1, ;1 s2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
CD, D, s1; s2 ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTSEQ1
CD, D, s ⇓ µ, D1, V D1
CD, D, ;1 s ⇓ µ, D1, V D1
AMLTIF
CD, D, e ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
CD ∪ V D1, D1, If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
CD, D, if e then s1 else s2 ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTIFTRUE
CD, D, s1 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
µ = {((M, true), M) | (M, true) ∈ fst(µ)} ◦ µ1
CD, D, If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ, D1, V D1
AMLTIFFALSE
CD, D, s2 ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
µ = {((M, false), M) | (M, false) ∈ fst(µ)} ◦ µ1
CD, D, If1 s1 s2 ⇓ µ, D1, V D1
AMLTWHILE
CD, D, e ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
CD ∪ V D1, D1, while1 e do s ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
CD, D, while e do s ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTWHILEFALSE
µ = {((M, false), M) | (M, false) ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
CD, D, while1 e do s ⇓ µ, D, ∅
AMLTWHILETRUE1
CD, D, s ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
CD ∪ V D1, D1, while2 e do s ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
µ = {((M, true), M) | (M, true) ∈ fst(µ)} ◦ µ1 ◦ µ2
CD, D, while1 e do s ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTWHILETRUE2
CD, D, while e do s ⇓ µ, D1, V D1
CD, D, while2 e do s ⇓ µ, D1, V D1
FIGURE 4.3 – Rules of the WHILE annotated multisemantics (statements)
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AMLTASG
CD, D, e ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
CD ∪ V D1, D1, x :=1⇓ µ2, D2, V D2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
CD, D, x := e ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTASG1
µ = {((M, v), M [x �→ v]) | (M, v) ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
CD, D, x :=1⇓ µ, D[x �→ CD], ∅
AMLTOUTPUT
CD, D, e ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1
CD ∪ V D1, D1, Ouput1 o ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2 µ = µ1 ◦ µ2
CD, D, Ouput o e ⇓ µ, D2, V D2
AMLTOUTPUT1
µ = {((M, v), M [o �→ v :: M(o)]) | (M, v) ∈ fst(µ)} µ �= ∅
CD, D, Ouput1 o ⇓ µ, D[o �→ D(o) ∪ CD], ∅
AMERGE
CD, D, t ⇓ µ1, D1, V D1 CD, D, t ⇓ µ2, D2, V D2
CD, D, t ⇓ µ1 ∪ µ2, D�, V D1 ∪ V D2
where D�(xo) = D1(xo) ∪ D2(xo) for all variable and output xo
FIGURE 4.4 – Rules of the WHILE annotated multisemantics (statements)
(bis)
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dependency and the value dependency is empty.
The rule AMLTOUTPUT1 is analogous to the previous rule AMLTASG1,
except that, as the store does not erase previous values, the old dependency
is not erased.
Finally, the rule AMERGE is exactly the same as the formal rule : the envi-
ronment dependency is merged by doing the union variable by variable and
output by output ; and the resulting value dependency is the union of both
resulting value dependencies.
4.3 Capturing masking
We have re-written the running example of Section 1.1.3 in the WHILE
language and we will call it P .
x := true;
y := true;
if Input "i"
then x := false
else skip;
if x
then y := false
else skip;
Output "o" y
We now show how our approach captures the dependency in that case. The
non-interference property only needs two executions to be negated, we thus
consider a multistate µ with two semantic contexts, one with false in the ﬁrst
input and one with true. We derive the running example in the annotated mul-
tisemantics with empty entering dependencies and we show that the output
o depends on the input i. We write D∅ the empty environment dependency, a
function returning an empty set for every variable and output.
We detail here, step by step, the crucial points of the derivation.
The ﬁrst if statement will be derived in states containing true in the x and
y variables. We ﬁrst have to derive the condition Input 1 and then derive the
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continuation. For the purpose of explanation, we replace the resulting depen-
dencies with question marks and we will see how the rules will constrain the
annotations to capture the information ﬂow.
∅, D∅, Input i ⇓ µi, D∅, {i}
{i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µ�P1 , ?, ?
{i}, D∅, ;1 If1 x := f skip ⇓ µ�P1 , ?, ?
∅, D∅, P1 ⇓ µP1 , ?, ?
with µP1 = µi ◦ µ�P1
The ﬁrst premise obviously produces an extra (the value in the input i)
and then its value dependency is {i}. The rule of the if statement makes the
dependency ﬂow into the context dependency of the continuation.
Unfortunately, both semantic contexts of µ�P1 do not have the same extra
because it corresponds to the value in the input i. The rule AMLTIFTRUE
cannot be applied here and we need to use the merge rule to separate µ�P1
into two multistates µt and µf .
{i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µt, ?, ? {i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µf , ?, ?
{i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µ�P1 , Dx, ∅
with µ�P1 = µt ∪ µf .
The ﬁrst premise goes into the ﬁrst branch of the conditional and captures
the dependency in Dx = D∅[x �→ {i}] because the current context depends
on the input i and an assignment has been done on x. The second branch
does not have the dependency since a skip statement has been derived.
{i}, D∅, x := f ⇓ µt, Dx, ∅
{i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µt, Dx, ∅
{i}, D∅, skip ⇓ µf , D∅, ∅
{i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µf , D∅, ∅
{i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µ�P1 , Dx, ∅
But the merge rule merges the dependencies and thus we know this piece
of code may induce information leaking from input i to variable x. We should
also notice that in the multistate µ�P1 (and thus µP1) the result having true
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stored in the input i has the value false stored in x and the other one has
true stored in x.
∅, D∅, Input i ⇓ µi, D∅, {i}
{i}, D∅, If1 x := f skip ⇓ µ�p1 , Dx, ∅
{i}, D∅, ;1 If1 x := f skip ⇓ µ�p1 , Dx, ∅
∅, D∅, P1 ⇓ µP1 , Dx, ∅
It leads us to derive P2 with the following entering annotations.
∅, Dx, x ⇓ µx, Dx, {i}
{i}, Dx, If1 y := f skip ⇓ µ�P2 , ?, ?
{i}, Dx, ;1 If1 y := f skip ⇓ µ�P2 , ?, ?
∅, Dx, P2 ⇓ µP2 , ?, ?
with µP2 = µx ◦ µ�P2
After the derivation of the variable x, we know that the returned value
depends on i because we derived x with the entering environment depen-
dency Dx. Then the same phenomenon than previously appears, we need
the merge rule to derive the left-hand part because the derivation of x made
the extras of the semantic contexts of µ�P2 to be different.
{i}, Dx, y := f ⇓ µ�t, Dxy, ∅
{i}, Dx, If1 y := f skip ⇓ µ�t, Dxy, ∅
{i}, Dx, skip ⇓ µ�f , Dx, ∅
{i}, Dx, If1 y := f skip ⇓ µ�f , Dx, ∅
{i}, Dx, If1 y := f skip ⇓ µ�P2 , Dxy, ∅
with µ�P2 = µ
�
t ∪ µ�f
The ﬁrst derivation tree captures the ﬂow of the context to y and up-
dates the resulting environment dependency Dxy = Dx[y �→ {i}] = D∅[x �→
{i}][y �→ {i}].
Finally, when deriving the output with these annotations, we have the de-
pendency between o and i because we know that y depended on i.
∅, Dxy, y ⇓ µy, Dxy, {i} {i}, Dxy, Ouput1 o ⇓ µ�o, Dxy, ∅
∅, Dxy, Ouput o y ⇓ µo, Dxy, ∅
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with µo = µy ◦ µ�o.
4.4 Limits
Over-approximations in the parameters
The ﬁrst source of over-approximation comes from the parameters of the
axioms. The WHILE language is simple enough to precisely deﬁne these pa-
rameters, but in the general case an axiom may write and read many inputs,
variables or outputs.
For instance we could introduce a term Swap x y taking two variables x
and y as parameters and swapping their value in the memory. This term is
derived in PBS with the axiom
SWAP
M, Swap x y → M [x �→ M(y)][y �→ M(x)]
this axiom reads and writes the variables x and y thus :
V arRead = V arWrite = {x, y}
InputRead = OutputWrite = ∅
ProdExtra = false
Let us suppose we have the following program.
x := In i;
y := In j;
swap x y
When deriving the swap instruction in the annotated multisemantic, we
already know that x depends on input i and y depends on input j.
We could then obtain the following derivation
∅, D, Swap x y ⇓ µ, D�, ∅
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such that
D = D∅[x �→ i][y �→ j]
and D� = D∅[x �→ {i, j}][y �→ {i, j}].
The result is that, after the swap, both x and y depend on both i and j
which is an overapproximation since now x does not depend on i anymore.
To ﬁx this overapproximation, it seems sufﬁcient to give, instead of the two
sets V arRead and InputRead, a set of inputs and a set of variables for each
variable and each output in V arWrite and OutputWrite.
Value-related overapproximations
We also may capture dependencies that do not lead to interference even if
the axioms are perfectly parametrized. For example, any annotated multide-
rivation of the following program will conclude that the output o depends on
the input i.
if Input i
then Output o 1
else Output o 1
The derivation has the same structure than the derivation of P1 that we build
in section 4.3. But in fact, changing input i would not change the output o.
The loss of precision comes from the fact that we only track dependencies,
and not the actual values being computed.
Non-executable semantics
This semantic is clearly not executable because of the ability to derive an
inﬁnite number of single derivations. But this is not an issue for two reasons.
The ﬁrst one is that we are not trying to build an analyser but a mathematical
object close to non-interference that is easier to manipulate in formal proof.
The second reason is that anyway, we want to be as complete as possible
and in the ideal case where there are no approximations, we could not be
executable since TINI is undecidable.
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CORRECTNESS
Now that we are convinced that the annotations capture non-interference,
we intend to formally prove it. Establishing a link between the annotated mul-
tisemantics and the formal deﬁnition of non-interference will later allow to
prove the correctness of analyzers. The correctness of the annotations is
expressed as follows
Theorem 1 (Fundamental Theorem). ∀t,
If ∀µ, D�, V D�, o public,
D∅, ∅, t ⇓ µ, D�, V D� =⇒ ∀i ∈ (D�o), i is public
Then t is non-interferent.
It states that if for all annotated multiderivation, any public output does not
depend on a private input then the program is non-interferent. Of course, this
theorem is valid under some hypotheses over the PBS rules. We will brieﬂy
explain the proof method and then we explain how the theorem is used in
practice to prove analyzers.
5.1 Hypotheses
Determinism (2 hypotheses)
There are two notions of determinism we assume. The ﬁrst one is a deter-
minism over the choice of the rules when deriving a term and the second one
is the determinism of the language.
The ﬁrst hypotheses we make is that, given a term t and a state σ, the
knowledge of the extra is enough to determine the unique rule that may be
applied to t in the state σ. In another word, if two rules apply on two states
agreeing on the extra, then the two rules are identical. The predicate applies
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r sigma states, if the rule is an axiom (respectively rule 1 or rule 2), that ax
sigma <> None (respectively up sigma <> None).
Hypothesis deterministic_rule :
forall t sigma1 sigma2 r1 r2,
List.In r1 (Rules t)
-> List.In r2 (Rules t)
-> applies r1 sigma1
-> applies r2 sigma2
-> extra sigma1 = extra sigma2
-> r2 = r1
.
Moreover, the rules themselves are deterministic : deriving a term t in
some state will always result in the same state.
Hypothesis deterministic_deriv :
forall t sigma sigma1’ sigma2’,
deriv t sigma sigma1’
-> deriv t sigma sigma2’
-> sigma1’ = sigma2’
.
Axioms (6 hypotheses)
Concerning axioms, we assume the writer of the semantics gave correct
parameters for inputRead, varRead, varWrite, outputWrite and prodExtra.
The following hypothesis are the formalization of hypotheses 1 to 6 of section
4.1
On one hand, if two states are equal on the extra and on the inputs and
variables read by the axiom (inputRead and variableRead), then applying an
axiom on those two states results in states that are equal on the variable
written by the axiom (varWrite). On the other hand, applying an axiom leaves
unmodiﬁed the variables not in varWrite.
Hypothesis HypVarWrite :
forall t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra,
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List.In (Ax t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra)
(Rules t)
-> forall sigma1 sigma2 sigma1’ sigma2’,
(ax sigma1 = Some sigma1’)
-> (ax sigma2 = Some sigma2’)
-> (extra sigma1 = extra sigma2)
-> (forall i, mem i iRead -> (Envi sigma1 i
= Envi sigma2 i))
-> (forall y, mem y vRead -> (Envx sigma1 y
= Envx sigma2 y))
-> (forall x, mem x vWrite -> (Envx sigma1’ x
= Envx sigma2’ x))
.
Hypothesis HypNotVarWrite :
forall t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra,
List.In (Ax t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra)
(Rules t)
-> forall sigma sigma’,
ax sigma = Some sigma’
-> forall x, x \notin vWrite
-> Envx sigma x = Envx sigma’ x
.
An analogous reasoning can be done for the outputs : if two states are
equal on the extra and on the inputs and variables read by the axiom
(inputRead and varRead), then applying an axiom on those two states
results in states that have the same value in the ﬁrst place of every output
written by the axiom (outputWrite). Moreover, applying an axiom leaves
unmodiﬁed the outputs not in outputWrite.
Hypothesis HypOutputWrite :
forall t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra,
List.In (Ax t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra)
(Rules t)
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-> forall sigma1 sigma2 sigma1’ sigma2’,
(ax sigma1 = Some sigma1’)
-> (ax sigma2 = Some sigma2’)
-> (extra sigma1 = extra sigma2)
-> (forall i, mem i iRead -> (Envi sigma1 i
= Envi sigma2 i))
-> (forall y, mem y vRead -> (Envx sigma1 y
= Envx sigma2 y))
-> forall o,
mem o oWrite
-> exists lv,
(Envo sigma1’ o = lv ++ (Envo sigma1 o))
/\ (Envo sigma2’ o = lv ++ (Envo sigma2 o))
.
Hypothesis HypNotOutputWrite :
forall t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra,
List.In (Ax t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra)
(Rules t)
-> forall sigma sigma’,
(ax sigma = Some sigma’)
-> (forall o, notin o oWrite
-> (Envo sigma o = Envo sigma’ o))
.
Finally, the read sets also have an impact on the extra : applying an axiom
that produces an extra on two states that are equal on the initial extra and on
the inputs and variables read by the axiom (inputRead and varRead) results
in states that have the same extra. Conversely, if the axiom does not produce
an extra, then the resulting extra is empty.
Hypothesis HypExtraProduced :
forall t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra,
List.In (Ax t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra)
(Rules t)
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-> forall sigma1 sigma2 sigma1’ sigma2’,
(ax sigma1 = Some sigma1’)
-> (ax sigma2 = Some sigma2’)
-> (extra sigma1 = extra sigma2)
-> (forall i, mem i iRead -> (Envi sigma1 i
= Envi sigma2 i))
-> (forall y, mem y vRead -> (Envx sigma1 y
= Envx sigma2 y))
-> (prodExtra = true)
-> (extra sigma1’ = extra sigma2’)
.
Hypothesis HypNoExtraProduced :
forall t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra,
List.In (Ax t ax iRead vRead vWrite oWrite prodExtra)
(Rules t)
-> forall sigma sigma’,
(ax sigma = Some sigma’)
-> ( (prodExtra = false)
->
(extra sigma’ = nil))
.
up and next (3 hypotheses)
We also give some constraints on the up and next functions. We suppose
that they do not impact the memory and that they may only change the extra.
For rules 1 and rules 2, if up is deﬁned, then it must not change nor inspect the
memory, i.e., it can only change the extra part of the state, and this change
is a function of the previous extra : up(M, e) = (M �, e�) =⇒ M � = M ∧ e� =
f(e). For rules 2, if next is deﬁned, then the new memory is the memory of
the second argument, and the new extra only depends on the extras of the
arguments : next((M1, e1), (M2, e2)) = (M, e) =⇒ M = M2 ∧ e = g(e1, e2).
Finally, given a term and an extra, at most one rule applies.
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Hypothesis HypUpR1 :
forall t t1 up,
List.In (R1 t t1 up) (Rules t)
-> exists f_extra,
forall sigma sigma’,
(up sigma = Some sigma’)
-> sameMemory sigma sigma’
/\ extra sigma’ = f_extra (extra sigma)
.
Hypothesis HypUpR2 :
forall t t1 t2 up next,
List.In (R2 t t1 t2 up next) (Rules t)
-> exists f_extra,
forall sigma sigma’,
(up sigma = Some sigma’)
-> sameMemory sigma sigma’
/\ extra sigma’ = f_extra (extra sigma)
.
Hypothesis HypNext :
forall t t1 t2 up next,
List.In (R2 t t1 t2 up next) (Rules t)
-> exists g_extra,
forall sigma sigma’ sigma’’,
(next sigma sigma’ = Some sigma’’)
-> sameMemory sigma’ sigma’’
/\ extra sigma’’ = g_extra (extra sigma)
(extra sigma’)
.
Inputs (1 hypothesis)
We also request that a derivation may not change the inputs of the state.
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Hypothesis HypNoWriteInput :
forall t s s’,
deriv t s s’
-> forall i, (inputs s i = inputs s’ i)
.
These hypotheses are not constraining except maybe for the determinism
of the semantics. It forbids random generators but we can still model pro-
grams with a bounded number k of calls to a random generator by allocating
k particular cells to this purpose before the execution of a program.
5.2 Correctness theorem
To compare the annotations and the non-interference property, we need
to formally deﬁne non-interference for a given language in Pretty-Big-Step
style as follow ( ).
We suppose we are given a language
Context {Syntax : AbstractSyntax}.
Context {Semantics : AbstractSemantics}.
and two functions to determine if inputs and outputs are public or not. An
input or output that is not public will be considered to be private.
Parameter isPublicInput : input -> bool.
Parameter isPublicOutput : output -> bool.
We can now deﬁne non-interference as in section 1.1.1
Definition NonInterferent (t : Term) : Prop :=
forall sigma1 sigma1’ sigma2 sigma2’,
deriv t sigma1 sigma1’
-> deriv t sigma2 sigma2’
-> initialState sigma1
-> initialState sigma2
-> (forall i, Bool.Is_true (isPublicInput i)
-> Envi sigma1 i = Envi sigma2 i)
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-> (forall o, Bool.Is_true (isPublicOutput o)
-> Envo sigma1’ o = Envo sigma2’ o)
.
We must specify that σ1 and σ2 are initial states, i.e. the variables are set
to the same initial value and that the outputs are empty.
The main theorem we prove is the following. It states that a term t is
non-interferent provided that for all annotated multiderivation of t starting with
empty dependencies and for all public output o the derivation ends with public
inputs in the dependency of o.
Theorem 2 (Fundamental Theorem ). ∀t,
If ∀µ, D�, V D�,
D∅, ∅, t ⇓ µ, D�, V D� =⇒ ∀o public,∀i ∈ (D�o), i is public
Then t is non-interferent.
Depending on the situation, it may be more interesting to use the contra-
position :
Theorem 3 (Contraposition). ∀t,
If t is interferent
Then ∃µ, D�, V D� public such that
D∅, ∅, t ⇓ µ, D�, V D� ∧ ∃o public such that ∃i ∈ (D�o), i is private
The corresponding coq code is the following ( )
Theorem correctness :
forall t,
(* if *)
(forall mu D’ VD’ o,
(* for all multiderivation *)
annot_multi_deriv empty (fun xo => empty) t mu D’ VD’
(* and for all public output o *)
-> Bool.Is_true (isPublicOutput o)
(* all the dependencies of o are public *)
-> (forall i, mem i (D’ (O o))
-> Bool.Is_true(isPublicInput i))
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(* then t is non-interferent *)
-> NonInterferent t
.
5.3 Proving an analyzer
Among the known methods to prove an analyzer, each one assumes the
program variables are given a security level (public or private in the traditional
case). One advantage of our technique is that we only need to give a secu-
rity level to the inputs and outputs a program may take, and not the internal
variables.
Given a program, proving the absence of information leakage with this
framework would require considering every annotated multiderivation with
exactly two pairs of states in the multistate and prove that there is no un-
wanted dependency. But proving interference requires only one annotated
multiderivation. This allows us to use the framework to prove analyses.
Let us consider an analysis ANI . It is a function returning false for at
least each interferent program and may have some false-negatives. But if the
function returns true, it means the analyzed program doubtlessly satisﬁes the
property of non-interference. In another words, if the program is interferent,
ANI must reject the program. The correctness property for the analyzer ANI
is the following :
Lemma 4. ∀P , if ANI(P ) then P is non-interferent.
Such proofs may be difﬁcult to do by induction on the program since non-
interference is an hyperproperty that is not deﬁned by induction. When as-
suming the hypothesis “P is interferent”, we only have information on what
happens before two executions (the states differ only on some private inputs)
and after (the resulting states differ on a public output). No information is gi-
ven on what happens in the program. Instead, if one uses our framework, it
is sufﬁcient to prove :
Lemma 5. ∀P ,
If ANI(P )
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Partie , Chapitre 5 – Correctness
Then ∀µ, D�, V D�, i private
D∅, ∅, P ⇓ µ, D�, V D� =⇒ ∀o public,∀i ∈ (D�o), i is public
As an example, ﬁgure 5.1 we consider the analyzer ( ) over our WHILE
language. This naive analyzer rejects every program that outputs a value on
a public output.
To prove the correctness of this analyzer, instead of using the notion of
non-interference, we prove the intermediate lemma ( ) of Figure 5.2 by in-
duction on the multiderivation. This lemma states that if the analyzer autho-
rizes the program and if a multiderivation starts with empty dependencies for
the public outputs, then the multiderivation ends with empty dependencies for
the public outputs.
This lemma allows to easily prove lemma 5 and then ensure the correct-
ness of the annotations.
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5.3. Proving an analyzer
Fixpoint NoPublicOutputAnalyzer (t : Term) :=
match t with
| Skip => true
| Seq s1 s2 => andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer s1)
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer s2)
| Seq1 s2 => NoPublicOutputAnalyzer s2
| If e st sf => andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e)
(andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer st)
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer sf))
| If1 st sf => (andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer st)
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer sf))
| While e s => andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e)
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer s)
| While1 e s => andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e)
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer s)
| While2 e s => andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e)
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer s)
| Assign x e => (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e)
| Assign1 x => true
| Out o e => andb (negb (isPublicOutput o))
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e)
| Out1 o => negb (isPublicOutput o)
| Var x => true
| Cons v => true
| Plus e1 e2 => andb (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e1)
(NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e2)
| Plus1 e2 => (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer e2)
| Plus2 => true
| In i => true
end.
FIGURE 5.1 – A non-interference analyzer
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Lemma invariant :
forall t CD D mu D’ VD’,
annot_multi_deriv CD D t mu D’ VD’
-> Is_true (NoPublicOutputAnalyzer t)
-> (forall o , Is_true (isPublicOutput o)
-> (D (O o) = \{}))
-> (forall o , Is_true (isPublicOutput o)
-> (D’ (O o) = \{}))
.
FIGURE 5.2 – Intermediate lemma
CONCLUSION
Summary
With the increasing use of software in our daily life and in particular with
sensitive data, managing the information ﬂow and formally ensuring security
properties becomes necessary. In this thesis, we proposed a way to automa-
tically build a new semantics (the annotated multisemantics) when an initial
one is given in Pretty-Big-Step form. The annotated multisemantics is a for-
mal object collecting local information of many classic executions and mer-
ging this information to detect interferent programs. This new semantics is a
formally proved tool to prove non-interference analyzers.
Pretty-Big-Step
The construction of this new semantics is automatic, granted that the ori-
ginal one is in PBS style. Additionally to the inherent advantages of PBS,
it ensures a structure easy to formalize. The axioms of the PBS semantics
must come with some extra parameters ensuring a sort of non-interference
over them only. Then this PBS must also verify 12 hypotheses :
1. Determinism over the rules : given a term and a state, only one rule
applies ;
2. Determinism over the results : given a term, a state and a rule, only one
state can be the result ;
3. 6 hypotheses concerning the correctness of additional parameters of
the axioms ;
4. 3 hypotheses over the up and next functions ;
5. and one ﬁnal hypothesis ensuring that inputs never change.
Annotated Multisemantics
From this Pretty-Big-Step semantics, we are then able to automatically
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build a multisemantics able to reason about many derivation at once and to
share information between two or more classic derivation at some program
point. Annotating this multiderivation allows us to track the dependencies du-
ring the considered executions and we proved that these annotations are
correct in relation to the non-interference property : if, among all the multide-
rivations of a program, none of them can exhibit a public output depending
on a private input then the program is non-interferent.
Proving an analyzer
Finally we formally proved the correctness of the annotations in relation to
the notion of non-interference.
Theorem 4 (Fundamental Theorem ). ∀t,
If ∀µ, D�, V D�,
D∅, ∅, t ⇓ µ, D�, V D� =⇒ ∀o public,∀i ∈ (D�o), i is public
Then t is non-interferent.
The theorem allows to prove the correctness of analyzers by reasoning
only with multiderivations which are deﬁned by induction, unlike
non-interference which is harder to manipulate.
Perspectives
This work can be continued in various directions. We already stated that it
is possible to improve the precision of the annotations. It would be interesting
to look at different hyperproperties and see if other annotated multisemantics
could also capture them. Finally, there is room for improvement in the path of
proving a analyzer for JavaScript.
Precision of the annotations
When writing the axioms rules in PBS, instead of the two sets V arRead and
InputRead, it may be interesting to give a set of input and a set of variable
for each variable and each output in V arWrite and OutputWrite. It should
improve the precision for axioms like Swap (see section 4.4) but this will not
remove value-dependent approximations.
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Toward completeness
Even if the problem of non-interference is undecidable, our multiseman-
tics can try to reach completeness since it only is a mathematical object for
proofs and not an executable semantics. To achieve completeness it seems
mandatory to investigate into the actual values stored or generated.
Different hyperproperty
Another direction to look into is the formalization of another hyperproperty,
especially ones requiring more than two executions to deﬁne, as nonmal-
leable information ﬂow [15] for example.
Toward JavaScript
Finally, proving a JavaScript analyzer would be a huge step and it requires
at least to rewrite the axioms of the Pretty-Big-Step semantics of JavaScript
already existing, to adapt the memory model and to prove the 12 hypotheses.
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ANNEXE A
PBS RULES OF WHILE IN COQ
Inductive Concr_value : Type :=
| Num (z:Z)
| Bool (b:bool)
.
Inductive Concr_Term: Type :=
(*Statements*)
| Skip : Concr_Term
| Seq : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Seq1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| If : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| If1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| While : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| While1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| While2 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Assign : variable -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Assign1 : variable -> Concr_Term
| Out : output -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Out1 : output -> Concr_Term
(*Expressions*)
| Var : variable -> Concr_Term
| Cons : Concr_value -> Concr_Term
| Plus : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Plus1 : Concr_Term -> Concr_Term
| Plus2 : Concr_Term
| In : input -> Concr_Term
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.Definition Concr_Rules (t:Concr_Term): list rule :=
match t with
(*Statements*)
| Skip =>
(Ax Skip
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
empty empty empty empty
false)
:: nil
| Seq s1 s2 =>
(R2 (Seq s1 s2)
(s1)
(Seq1 s2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, nil => Some res
| _, _ => None end))
:: nil
| Seq1 s2 =>
(R1 (Seq1 s2)
(s2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end))
:: nil
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| While e s =>
(R2 (While e s)
(e)
(While1 e s)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, b :: nil => Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
| While1 e s =>
(R2 (While1 e s)
(s)
(While2 e s)
(fun sc => (match extra sc with
| (Bool true) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
| _ => None end))
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| (Bool true) :: nil, nil =>
Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: (Ax (While1 e s)
(fun sc => (match extra sc with
| (Bool false) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
| _ => None end))
empty empty empty empty
false)
:: nil
| While2 e s =>
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(R1 (While2 e s)
(While e s)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end))
:: nil
| Assign x e =>
(R2 (Assign x e)
(e)
(Assign1 x)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, v :: nil => Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
| Assign1 x =>
(Ax (Assign1 x)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| v::nil =>
Some (update_extra
(update_var sc x v)
nil)
| _ => None end)
empty empty (singleton x) empty
false)
:: nil
| Out1 o =>
(Ax (Out1 o)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
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| v::nil =>
Some (update_extra
(update_output sc o v)
nil)
| _ => None end)
empty empty empty (singleton o)
false)
:: nil
| Out o e=>
(R2 (Out o e)
(e)
(Out1 o)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, v :: nil => Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
| If e s1 s2 =>
(R2 (If e s1 s2)
(e)
(If1 s1 s2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, (Bool _) :: nil =>
Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
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| If1 s1 s2 =>
(R1 (If1 s1 s2)
(s1)
(fun sc => (match extra sc with
| (Bool true) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
| _ => None end)))
:: (R1 (If1 s1 s2)
(s2)
(fun sc => (match extra sc with
| (Bool false) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
| _ => None end)))
:: nil
(*Expressions*)
| Cons v =>
(Ax (Cons v)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil =>
Some (update_extra sc (v::nil))
| _ => None end)
empty empty empty empty
true)
:: nil
| Var x =>
(Ax (Var x)
(fun sc => match extra sc, Envx sc x with
| nil, Some v =>
Some (update_extra sc (v :: nil))
| _,_ => None end)
empty (singleton x) empty empty
true)
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:: nil
| Plus e1 e2 =>
(R2 (Plus e1 e2)
(e1)
(Plus1 e2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil => Some sc
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| nil, (Num _)::nil => Some res
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
| Plus1 e2 =>
(R2 (Plus1 e2)
(e2)
(Plus2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| (Num _)::nil =>
Some (update_extra sc nil)
| _ => None end)
(fun sc res => match extra sc, extra res with
| (Num n1)::nil, (Num n2)::nil =>
Some (update_extra res
[(Num n1);(Num n2)])
| _,_ => None end))
:: nil
| Plus2 =>
(Ax (Plus2)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| (Num n1) :: (Num n2) :: nil =>
Some (update_extra sc
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[Num (n1+n2)])
| _ => None end)
empty empty empty empty
true)
:: nil
| In i =>
(Ax (In i)
(fun sc => match extra sc with
| nil =>
Some (update_extra sc [Envi sc i])
| _ => None end)
(singleton i) empty empty empty
true)
:: nil
end.
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Titre : Certiﬁcation d’Analyses Non Locales avec
une Sémantique Annotée
Mot clés : multisémantique annotée ; non-interférence ; certiﬁcation
Resumé : La quantité croissante
de données traitées par les logiciels
rend légitime le besoin de garanties
de conﬁdentialité. La propriété de non-
interférence assure qu’un programme ne
fuite pas de données privées vers une
sortie publique.
Nous proposons une méthode pour
construire, une multisémantique anno-
tée capable de capturer la propriété de
non-interférence pour aider à prouver for-
mellement des analyseurs. Nous fournis-
sons un théorème prouvé indiquant que
les annotations capturent correctement
la non-interférence.
Le théorème de correction permet de
prouver un analyseur sans s’appuyer sur
la déﬁnition de non-interférence mais sur
les annotations.
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Abstract : Because of the increasing
quantity of data processed by software,
the need for privacy guarantees is legi-
timate. The property of non-interference
ensures that a program does not leak pri-
vate data to a public output.
We propose a framework to build an
annotated multisemantics able to capture
the non-interference property to help for-
mally prove analysers. The framework
comes with a proved theorem stating that
the annotations correctly capture non-
interference.
The correctness theorem allows to
prove an analyser without relying on the
deﬁnition of non-interference but on the
annotations.
